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COMMENTS 
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE IN CALIFORNIA: 
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSES 
A tremendous surge in the reporting of child sexual abuse 
cases is occurring in the United States today.l As a result of this 
increase, many state legislatures are beginning to adapt their 
criminal justice systems to the unique problems that child vic-
tims experience when confronting that system. The California 
Legislature is on the forefront of such change, spurred on in part 
by organized group pressure from Californians who have been 
affected by the problem of child sexual abuse.2 
This Comment focuses on recent and proposed changes in 
California law that have occurred as a result of our "discover-
ing"3 that thousands of children in this state are sexually abused 
each year. The majority of laws enacted will undoubtedly benefit 
1. L.A. Times, Feb. 17, 1985, at 2, col. 1. The Times cited a study by the National 
Committee for the Prevention of Child Abuse which stated that reports of child sexual 
abuse were up 35% nationwide in 1984. The greatest increase in reported sexual abuse 
cases was in Mississippi, at 126%. Other states with increases of more than 50% were 
Nebraska, 121%; Missouri, 100%; Oregon, 83%; and Wisconsin, 82%. [d. 
2. One such organization is Stronger Legislation Against Child Molesters 
(S.L.A.M.), a group that has regularly lobbied the state legislature and attended commit-
tee hearings that have been conducted throughout the state. See, e.g., Child Molestation: 
Hearing Before the California Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice, 31-52 (Nov. 
12, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Assembly Hearings] (testimony of five members of 
S.L.A.M.). As their name suggests, S.L.A.M. takes the approach of locking up all molest-
ers and throwing the key away. While such action might be justified in some cases, 
S.L.A.M.'s tendency to sensationalize the most gruesome of child molestations adds little 
reasoned thought to the complex problems that child molestation presents to society. 
See id. at 35-36 (coordinator of S.L.A.M. in Bakersfield, California, recalls incident 
where a priest was discovered orally copulating a 12-year-old paralyzed girl in a hospi-
tal). See also id. at 43 (organizer of S.L.A.M. tells of 8-year-old boy who had a cigarette 
lighter held under his penis by a child molester). 
3. While reports of child sexual abuse are up dramatically, experts are divided on 
whether more children are being abused today than in the past or whether the increase 
in reporting is due to more children mustering up the nerve to confront their molester. 
San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 18, 1984, at 20, col. 1. See also infra note 91, which dis-
cusses the possibility that some reports of sexual abuse are fabricated. 
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the children who come in contact with the courts. However, a 
well-developed body of legislative and common law has been 
forged over the past century in California and should not be im-
providently discarded. Many of the evidentiary issues relating to 
child molestation cases have been addressed by both the legisla-
ture and the courts over the years. Perhaps the true test of our 
criminal justice system is not the change made to adapt the sys-
tem to current demands, but to what extent the system remains 
consistent in applying laws that have evolved over many years. 
The scope of this Comment is purposefully broad, intended 
to give the reader an overview of the varied legal problems that 
surround child sexual abuse cases in California.4 The Comment 
is divided into three sections. The first section defines the prob-
lem of child sexual abuse, surveys its far-reaching societal ef-
fects, and discusses how the California Legislature has re-
sponded to the problem. The second section comments on the 
pivotal factors that should be properly weighed when a decision 
is made to prosecute a suspected child molester. The third and 
main section discusses the evidentiary problems that permeate 
many aspects of child molestation cases. Numerous credibility 
and corroboration issues are analyzed, with emphasis on relevant 
recent and proposed changes in both the penal and evidentiary 
law. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Defining Sexual Abuse 
The sexual abuse of children is distinct from what is com-
monly known as "child abuse"-the physical beating of chil-
dren. 1I As defined under California law, an act of child sexual 
abuse occurs when 
[a]ny person ... willfully and lewdly commit(s) 
any lewd or lascivious act . . . upon or with the 
body, or any part or member thereof, of a child 
4. By focusing on the law in California, it is hoped that not only will the California 
legal community be enlightened as to some of the complex issues in child sexual abuse 
cases, but that other states can learn from many of the progressive steps that California 
has taken in the area. 
5. As prevalent as the sexual abuse of our nation's children appears to be, it is esti-
mated that twice a8 many children are physically abused each year. CRIME PREVENTION 
CENTER, OFFICE OF THE CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL, CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION HAND-
BOOK 4 (1983) [hereinafter cited as CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION HANDBOOK). 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss3/1
1985] CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
under the age of 14 years, with the intent of 
arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or 
passions or sexual desires of such person or of 
such child . . . .6 
439 
A "lewd or lascivious" act between an adult and a child 
most often involves some kind of genital fondling,7 but may con-
sist of more severe conduct such as oral copulation or vaginal 
and/or anal intercourse. When vaginal intercourse, anal inter-
course, or oral copulation do occur, the offender may be tried 
under the separate statutes that prohibit such activity.8 Further-
more, if intercourse occurs and the offender is a parent, the par-
ent may be prosecuted for incest.9 
B. Prevalence 
Statistics on the number of sexually abused children in this 
country vary greatly.lO One study estimates that 19.2% of the 
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a) (West Supp. 1985). In addition to this felony child 
molestation section, there is a misdemeanor Penal Code section which details the offense 
of "annoying or molesting children" and is often charged when the sexual conduct be-
tween the defendant and victim is less severe, such as a grab at a shirt or pants. CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 647a (West Supp. 1985). 
7. In one study of successfully prosecuted cases done by the Kinsey Institute, the 
average sexual abuse victim was a girl of age eight, and the sexual activities usually con-
sisted of fondling, heavy petting, exposure, masturbation and some mouth-genital con-
tacts. D. MACNAMARA & E. SAGARlN, SEX, CRIME, AND THE LAW 72 (1977). In California 
cases published at the appellate level, most section 288 charges involved genital fondling 
that led to more serious sexual contact (e.g. oral copulation or intercourse), conduct for 
which the defendant is charged separately. 
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West Supp. 1985) (unlawful sexual intercourse with a 
minor); CAL. PENAL CODE § 286 (West Supp. 1985) (sodomy); CAL. PENAL CODE § 288a 
(West Supp. 1985) (oral copulation). Rape may be charged if the abusive incident in-
volves forcible intercourse, although the defense of consent could then be raised. CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 261 (West Supp. 1985). The statutes forbidding lewd or lascivious con-
duct, sodomy, and oral copulation also contain provisions to charge a defendant who uses 
force, violence, duress, or menace towards a victim while committing the charged lewd 
act. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(b) (West Supp. 1985); CAL. PENAL CODE § 286(c) (West 
Supp. 1985); CAL. PENAL CODE § 288a(c) (West Supp. 1985). See also People v. Hager-
man, 164 Cal. App. 3d 967, 970, 210 Cal. Rptr. 504, 505 (1985) (defendant charged with 
one count of forcible rape, three counts of forcible oral copulation, one count of a forcible 
lewd and lascivious act, and one count of sodomy by force with a child under 14). While 
the victim's consent is not a defense to a section 288(a) charge (People v. Toliver, 270 
Cal. App. 2d 492, 496, 75 Cal. Rptr. 819, 821 (1969)), knowing consent by a minor who is, 
in fact, capable of such consent is an affirmative defense to an alleged violation of section 
288(b) "by use of force." People v. Cicero, 157 Cal. App. 3d 465, 484, 204 Cal. Rptr. 582, 
595 (1984). 
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 285 (West Supp. 1985). 
10. One national magazine reported that researchers' estimates on the number of 
sexually abused children in the United States range from 100,000 to 500,000 annually. 
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women and 8.6 % of the men in this country have been sexually 
abused as children.11 Intrafamilial abuse l2 is the most prevalent 
form of child sexual abuse; it is estimated that between two and 
five million American women have been sexually abused through 
incestuous relationships.13 While females are by no means the 
only victims of such abuse,14 the overwhelming reported number 
of sexually abused children are female. III Whatever prevalence 
the statistics indicate, child sexual abuse is believed to be among 
the least reported crimes in this country,16 leaving to speculation 
the actual number of sexually abused children. 
The number of reported sexual abuse cases has increased 
dramatically over the past decade. While the federal government 
has not compiled national statistics,17 the California Bureau of 
Criminal Statistics reports that sexual assaults on minors in Cal-
Watson, Lubenow, Greenberg, King & Junkin, A Hidden Epidemic, NEWSWEEK, May 14, 
1984, at 30 [hereinafter cited as NEWSWEEK). 
11. D. FINKELHOR, SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILDREN 53 (1979). The author bases his 
estimates on data taken from 796 college students, 530 females and 266 males. This stu-
dent sample probably excluded some crucial segments of the relevant population, but 
likely presented a more representative group than previous studies, which focuses on 
court cases, therapy clients, and volunteers in studying the problem of child molestation. 
Id. at 40, 42. 
12. In discussing sexual abuse, "incest" means sexual activity between persons who 
are blood related; "intrafamilial" abuse refers to sexual activity between family members 
not related by blood (stepparents, a mother's boyfriend, etc.). CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION 
HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 10. For the purposes of this Comment, the definition of 
"intrafamilial" will be broadened to include the child's natural parents. 
13. NEWSWEEK, supra note 10, at 31, col. 1 (interview with David Finkelhor, Family 
Violence Research Project). 
14. See Swift, Sexual Victimization of Children: An Urban Mental Health Center 
Survey, in THE SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 18, 20 (L. Schultz ed. 1980). The author 
cites several studies which provide evidence that the sexual assault rate on male children 
may approach (or surpass) the rate on females. Id. 
15. Herman & Hirschman, Father-Daughter Incest, in THE SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY OF 
YOUTH 97, 98 (L. Schultz ed. 1980). The authors find an overwhelming predominance of 
father-daughter incest in all existing surveys, but question whether these data reflect a 
difference in the number of complaints. Id. at 98-99. 
16. NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION, CHILD 
SEXUAL ABUSE: LEGAL ISSUES AND ApPROACHES 2 (rev. ed. 1981) (Josephine Bulkley, Di-
rector, Child Sexual Abuse Project) [hereinafter cited as CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE]. Until 
recently, child sexual abuse was not even specifically covered by many of the state 
mandatory child abuse reporting statutes, although most states have corrected this over-
sight. Law enforcement agencies have also been lax in reporting sexual abuse to other 
agencies who keep such statistics. Id. at 2-3. 
17. The F.B.I. has not kept national statistics on incidents of child sexual abuse. 
These figures are subsumed into the larger category of "sex crimes." However, indepen-
dent groups have attempted recently to estimate reports of child sexual abuse across the 
nation. See supra note 1. 
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ifornia increased nearly fivefold between 1977 and 1983.1S The 
number of child sexual abuse cases in 1984 in California could 
quadruple the number of incidents investigated in 1981.18 Ex-
perts in the area of child sexual abuse offer various explanations 
for this increase in reporting,20 but it is unclear whether this "si-
lent" crime is more prevalent today than in the past. Society, 
however, appears more willing to confront this taboo now than it 
has in the past, as it is discovering that not only are many chil-
dren physically abused nationwide,21 but that a substantial por-
tion of these incidents involve sexual conduct as well.22 
C. Effects 
The child victim potentially suffers many consequences as a 
result of sexual abuse: extreme feelings of guilt, self-hate, in-
tense fear, anxiety, confusion, increased susceptibility to sexual 
exploitation, delinquent or criminal behavior, and possibly a fear 
of all sexual conduct.2s Since the abuser is often a father,24 step-
18. San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 18, 1984, at 1, col. 5. 
19. [d. at 1, col. 5; [d. at 20, col. 1. 
20. Dr. Roland Summit, a Southern California specialist in the sexual exploitation 
of children, believes that the sexual abuse of children was considered in the past to be a 
relatively rare phenomena because society has long had a denial syndrome when it comes 
to such disclosures: "Some of the disclosures we were hearing from children were so fan-
tastic no one wanted to believe it." [d. at 20, col. 2. In the same article, a spokeswoman 
for the California Department of Social Services said: "I don't think there's any question 
that all of the recent publicity has increased the reporting [of sexual abuse incidents]." 
[d. at 20, col. 3. Confirming the role that publicity has played in the dramatic increase of 
disclosures, reported incidents in Santa Clara County, California, increased from 30 cases 
in 1972 to over 1,000 cases in 1984. See INSTITUTE FOR THE COMMUNITY AS EXTENDED 
FAMILY, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE TREATMENT/TRAINING PROGRAM FACT SHEET (1984). Much 
of this increase is undoubtedly from the intensive public education effort in Santa Clara 
County, which encourages both victims and their parents to report abusive situations. 
See Cobey & Minzer, Santa Clara County Sexual Abuse Treatment Program, in INNO-
VATIONS IN THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 24-32 (J. Bulkley ed. 1981) 
(a report of the Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection). 
21. CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 13. On the basis of ex-
isting information, over one million children in the United States are abused or ne-
glected and the number has been steadily increasing over the past few years. [d. 
22. [d. (Thirty percent of the child abuse cases reported to the California Depart-
ment of Justice in 1982 involved sexual abuse.) 
23. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 16, at 3-4. Besides the above effects, these au-
thors note the following: incredible anguish, shame, and humiliation; regressive behavior 
or a variety of personality and physical disorders; mistrust of adults; and long term dor-
mant aftereffects which make the victim a "psychological time bomb" (often leading to 
depression, promiscuity or prostitution). [d. Seemingly confirming this last observation 
was a report finding that an estimated 67 % of the prostitutes in San Francisco were 
sexually abused as children. James & Meyerding, Early Sexual Experience and Prosti-
5
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father,2Ii or other trusted figure,26 the child has relatively few 
people to whom to report the abuse.27 Even if the child musters 
up the courage to tell someone about this "secret,"28 there is a 
chance that whomever he or she tells will either overreact hys-
terically29 or not believe the child's word over an adult's denials 
of sexual impropriety. so 
If a molestation is reported to the police, the sexually vic-
tution 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1381, 1383 (1977). 
24. See, e.g., People v. Younghanz, 156 Cal. App. 3d 811, 814, 202 Cal. Rptr. 907, 
909 (1984) (defendant had intercourse periodically with daughter for approximately 
eight years). 
25. See, e.g., People v. Battaglia, 156 Cal. App. 3d 1058, 1060, 203 Cal. Rptr. 370, 
371 (1984) (defendant sexually molested his stepdaughter on two occasions). 
26. See, e.g., People v. Gordon, 165 Cal. App. 3d 839, 846-47, 212 Cal. Rptr. 174, 
178-79 (1985) (defendant sodomized and committed lewd acts upon bodies of two chil-
dren whom he was babysitting); People v. Hetherington, 154 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 1136, 201 
Cal. Rptr. 756, 757 (1984) (defendant molested children for three years while operating a 
licensed day care center). 
[d. 
27. FINKELHOR, supra note 11, at 106: 
[Slome people harbor their experience all their lives, unable to 
reveal it, and it leaves a permanent scar. Never able to be 
reassured about the experience, never able to find out what 
others think, they feel an ineradicable sense of differentness 
and stigma. Only by sharing the experience can the scar be 
healed. 
28. See S. BUTLER, CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE 32-33 (1978). In many cases of father-
daughter incest, the father enjoins the child to secrecy in order to ensure her availability 
to him. This is most often accomplished with threats of dire consequences should she 
disclose her behavior to her mother or anyone else. [d. 
29. Schultz, The Child as a Sex Victim: Socio-Legal Perspectives, in RAPE VIC-
TIMOLOGY 257, 264 (L. Schultz ed. 1975). "Parents may overreact, become hysterical or 
physically attack the offender in front of the child .... Parents will need help in ac-
cepting the offense in such a way that horror, panic and fright are not communicated to 
the child so as to create a trauma where perhaps none existed before." [d. 
30. See Stevens & Berliner, Special Techniques for Child Witnesses, in THE SEX-
UAL VICTIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 246, 252 (1980). "Adults are extremely reluctant to believe a 
child or an adult .... Popular mythology dictates that children often fabricate tales of 
sexual assault despite a lack of any research to substantiate this belief." [d. See also 
People v. Gordon, 165 Cal. App. 3d 839, 848, 212 Cal. Rptr. 174,179-80 (1985) (victim's 
mother informed of abuse but did not call police because it was "really hard to believe" 
and she thought "it would be better for her just to forget about it"). Even if a child is 
believed, other factors may lead to the sexual abuse continuing. See J. Herman, FATHER-
DAUGHTER INCEST 89 (1981), stating that some intrafamilial cases, mothers may make no 
effort to stop a father's abuse in order to protect their own failing marriages. Cf. Gordon, 
165 Cal. App. 3d at 847, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 179, where one of the victims' mother had 
married the defendant's son. Upon learning of the sexual abuse from her daughter, the 
mother delayed in reporting the abuse to anyone for 15 months because her husband 
told her that if she put his father in jail she had better file for divorce as well. [d. 
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timized child can suffer extreme trauma as a result of his or her 
experiences in the criminal justice system.31 One law enforce-
ment official estimates that a child sexual abuse victim may be 
required to repeat her story as many as fourteen to sixteen times 
before going to court.32 Furthermore, the methods by which law 
enforcement personnel and prosecutors interview child victims 
are often insensitive and not adapted to the child's level of 
understanding.33 
D. Legislative Response 
Numerous recently enacted statutes indicate that the Cali-
fornia Legislature recognizes the serious problem of child sexual 
abuse. In an effort to discover which children are abused, 
stricter child abuse reporting laws expand the number of per-
sons who must report suspected sexual abuse to a child protec-
tion agency.34 Underscoring the importance of these laws, the 
31. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 16, at 4. The anticipation of testifying in court, 
not to mention the actual experience of doing so, can be agonizing to the child. Further-
more, the child may be coerced by other family members not to "fink on dad" or to 
recant earlier statements. [d. Some children will not wish to testify against their father 
because if the testimony is believed, the father could go to prison and the family would 
lose its breadwinner. 
32. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 16, at 10 (citing a presentation by Sgt. Carol 
Painter, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dept., at Judicial System Personnel Workshop, 
sponsored by Guardian Ad Litem/Dependency Court Improvement Project, in Los Ange-
les, California (June 27, 1980)). 
33. See Pirro, The Prosecution and Defense of Child Sexual Assault, in THE PROS-
ECUTION AND DEFENSE OF SEX CRIMES 9-1, 9-40 (B. Morosco ed. 1984), stating that special 
time and care should be taken to understand the psychological and neurological develop-
ment of the child. In interviewing a child, law enforcement officials should be used at a 
minimum. No more than two persons should handle the case from beginning to end and 
the interviews should take place in an atmosphere in which the child is comfortable. [d. 
at 9-41. If pre-verbal children are involved, the use of anatomically correct dolls may 
facilitate the child's explanation of exactly what occurred. These dolls can be crucial to 
both the prosecution and defense because they readily distinguish between the various 
sex acts (intercourse, oral copulation, sodomy) that may have occurred. [d. 
34. Act of Sept. 25, 1980, ch. 1071, § 4, 1980 Cal. Stat. 3420 (codified at CAL. PENAL 
CODE §§ 11165-11172) (West Supp. 1985). In California, the following persons must re-
port suspected cases of child abuse: any teacher, administrative officer, supervisor of 
child welfare and attendance, or certified pupil personnel employees of any public or 
private school; public or private day camp administrators; community care facility ad-
ministrators; headstart teachers; licensing workers or evaluators; social workers, public 
assistance workers, and probation officers; residential care facilities personnel; physi-
cians, surgeons, psychologists, dentists, nurses, chiropractors, and dental hygienists; 
county health employees, coroners, and paramedics; marriage, family, or child counsel-
ors; and all police, sheriffs, county probation personnel, and county welfare personnel. 
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165-11166 (West Supp. 1985). It is interesting to note that in 1984 
a bill was proposed which would have made all persons in the state subject to mandatory 
7
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California Supreme Court has held that these reporting obliga-
tions take precedence over any physician-patient or psychother-
apist-patient privilege.slI The reporting statutes have also sur-
vived constitutional challenges.ss Persons who are required to 
make disclosures of suspected abuse are statutorily immune 
from both civil and criminal prosecution unless it is proven that 
a false report was made and the person knew it was false. 37 If 
the disclosing person is sued and subsequently prevails, he or 
she can collect reasonable attorney's fees from the state. S8 
The belief that child sexual abuse victims are further trau-
matized by the criminal justice system is evidenced by recent 
legislation authorizing the preparation of standard investigative 
procedures to be used by local police agencies when investigating 
a suspected case of child sexual abuse.s9 Funding for local assis-
tance centers for victims and witnesses of child sexual abuse has 
been codified,40 as have strict procedures to guide district attor-
reporting. Cal. A.B. 2704 (1983-84). Bills such as this may portend an even greater ex-
pansion of child abuse reporting laws in this country. 
35. People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 512, 668 P.2d 738, 743, 194 Cal. Rptr. 431, 
436 (1983) (legislature intended to provide specific exception to general privilege be-
tween physician or psychotherapist and patient). However, such exception will apply 
"only when the patient's case falls squarely within its ambit." [d. at 513, 668 P.2d at 743, 
194 Cal. Rptr. at 436. 
36. See People v. Battaglia, 156 Cal. App. 3d 1058, 1062-65, 203 Cal. Rptr. 370, 372-
75 (1984) (dismissing both a "right to privacy" challenge and a fifth amendment Mi-
randa challenge); People v. Younghanz, 156 Cal. App. 3d 811, 815-18, 202 Cal. Rptr. 907, 
909-11 (1984) (dismissing a "fundamental right to seek a cure for one's illnesses" chal-
lenge and a fifth amendment challenge on "self-incrimination" grounds). 
37. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11172(a) (West Supp. 1985). 
38. Id. at subd. (c). 
39. Act of Sept. 30, 1981, ch. 1062, § 1, 1981 Cal. Stat. 4090 (codified at CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 13516) (West Supp. 1985). This Penal Code section provides in pertinent part: 
The commission shall prepare guidelines establishing standard 
procedures which may be followed by police agencies in the 
investigation of sexual assault cases, and cases involving sex-
ual exploitation or sexual abuse of children, including, police 
response to, and treatment of, victims of such crimes .... 
The commission shall prepare and implement a course for the 
training of specialists in the investigation of . . . child sexual 
abuse cases . . . . 
[d. at subd. (a) & (c). 
40. Act of Sept. 30, 1983, ch. 1312, § 2, 1983 Cal. Stat. __ (codified at CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 13835) (West Supp. 1985). The intent of the legislation is stated in the statute as 
follows: 
That there is a need to develop methods to reduce the trauma 
and insensitive treatment that victims and witnesses may ex-
perience in the wake of a crime, since all too often citizens 
8
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neys in deciding whether or not to prosecute a suspected child 
molester, with the needs of the child victim receiving priority in 
this decision making process.41 Other legislation has established 
a State Children's Trust Fund to help address the needs of child 
victims and witnesses.42 
Perhaps most important of all legislation in this area is the 
establishment of the Child Sexual Abuse Prevention Training 
Centers, which recognize the "need to develop programs to pro-
vide the kinds of innovative strategies and services which will 
ameliorate, reduce, and ultimately eliminate the trauma of child 
sexual abuse. "43 These are lofty goals indeed, but new programs 
such as this must be funded if a serious attempt is to be made to 
make children equal participants in the criminal justice system. 
One area of prevention that receives surprisingly little at-
tention is the need to educate children about their right to sex-
ual privacy. In 1984, one bill died in the California Legislature 
who become involved with the criminal justice system, either 
as victims or witnesses to crime, are further victimized by that 
system. 
Id. at subd. (a). 
41. Act of Sept. 14, 1983, ch. 804, § 2, 1983 Cal. Stat. __ (codified at CAL. PENAL 
CODE §§ 1000.12-.18) (West Supp. 1985). Although section looo.12(a) states the intent 
that "nothing in this chapter is intended to deprive a prosecuting attorney of the ability 
to prosecute persons suspected . . . of an act of abuse . . . to the fullest extent of the 
law," section 1000.12(b) proceeds to declare that "the prosecuting attorney may refer 
that person to the county department in charge of public social services or the probation 
department for counseling and other such services .... The prosecuting attorney shall 
seek the advice of the county department in charge of public social services or the proba-
tion department in determining whether or not to make the referral." CAL. PENAL CODE § 
1000.12 (a) & (b) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). The decision on whether to pros-
ecute the offender turns on the particular facts of the case at hand and will be discussed 
in section II of this Comment. 
42. Act of Sept. 24, 1982, ch. 1399, § 2, 1982 Cal. Stat. 5334 (codified at CAL. WELF. 
& INST. CODE §§ 18965-18970) (West Supp. 1985). The Children's Trust Fund consists of 
revenue from county surcharges on birth certificates, grants, gifts, bequests, and money 
appropriated for the fund from the state legislature or local government agencies. CAL. 
WELF. & INST. CODE § 18966 (West Supp. 1985). Furthermore, money from tax returns 
may be earmarked for the fund by individual taxpayers, supplementing the revenue re-
ceived from the aforementioned sources. Act of Sept. 26, 1983, ch. 1082, § 2, 1983 Cal. 
Stat. __ (codified at CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 18500-18504) (West Supp. 1985). 
Hopefully, the mere mentioning of the Trust Fund on Tax return forms will help to 
publicize the plight of the many sexually and physically abused children in California. 
43. Act of Sept. 30, 1984, ch. 1664, §3, 1984 Cal. Stat. __ (codified at CAL. WELF. 
& INST. CODE §§ 18275-18279.5) (West Supp. 1985). This statute provides for the selec-
tion of two child sexual abuse prevention training centers, one in Northern California 
and one in Southern California). Id. 
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that would have funded the development and dissemination of 
instructional materials to schools on child abuse and neglect. 44 
There is a strong need for such programs because until the in-
herent sexual vulnerability of children is recognized, the sexual 
exploitation of our nation's youth will continue unabated. 
II. THE DECISION TO PROSECUTE 
In deciding whether to prosecute a suspected child molester, 
there is a tendency to favor prosecution whenever sufficient evi-
dence exists for a conviction. However, this overlooks a crucial 
element of the prosecutorial equation: what is best for the child 
victim?41i To help answer this question, it is necessary to deter-
mine first whether the abuser is a pedophile and second whether 
the abuser is a close relative of the child. 
A. Pedophillic Sexual Abuse 
A pedophile is a person who engages in sexual activity with 
prepuberal children as a repeatedly preferred or exclusive 
method of achieving sexual satisfaction.46 The pedophile seeks 
out children for sexual purposes in much the same manner as 
one adult would seek out another.47 The number of pedophiles 
in the United States is unknown, but if the thriving child por-
nography business is any indication, the number is substantia1.48 
Whatever the actual number of pedophiles is, the number un-
44. Cal. A.B. 2699 (1983-84). 
45. See CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 16, at 7. Some criminal proceedings lead to 
the father's incarceration, splitting up the family and potentially leading to the child's 
intense guilt and blame for what has occurred to the family. Furthermore, if acquittal 
occurs, the child may well ask himself whether anything can be done. [d. at 8. 
46. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 271-72 (3d ed. 1980). 
47. Child Molestation: Hearings before the California Joint Committee for Revi-
sion of the Penal Code (April 10, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Revision Hearings) (testi-
mony of a pedophile): 
[d. at 77. 
Your pedophillic world, if you would, is a literal microcosm of 
the world we all know. You can take any of the adult hetero-
sexual types . . . and you will find exactly the same operating 
in the pedophillic world. You will find the type of man who is 
an opportunist, who wants a one time sexual encounter with 
somebody. You will find ones who literally, emotionally settle 
down and get married to a child. 
48. Increased arrests of pedophiles in California has led to the confiscation of 
thousands of magazines, films, and photographs depicting children in various stages of 
sexual activity. CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION HANDROOK, supra note 5, at 12. 
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss3/1
1985] CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 447 
derestimates the extent of their danger to children because each 
pedophile tends to have numerous victims.49 
When a pedophile sexually abuses a child, little can be done 
outside of the criminal justice system. 50 There is no known 
"cure" for pedophilia,51 just as there is no known "cure" for 
hetero- or homosexuality. Hence, prosecuting pedophiles is nec-
essary because they will molest a child the next time they desire 
sex with another person. A recent bill proposed in the California 
Legislature would establish the Repeat Child Abuser Prosecu-
tion Program, with state funding for counties participating in 
the program.1I2 Through this program, the prosecution of child 
abusers will be enhanced by vertical prosecutorial representa-
tion,1I3 the assignment of highly qualified investigators and pros-
ecutors,54 and a significant reduction of caseloads for prosecutors 
assigned to repeat child abuse cases.511 
To help keep pedophiles in prison and off the streets, Cali-
49. One pedophile estimated that he has victimized around 14 children. Revision 
Hearings, supra note 47, at 74. This person testified that he knew a scoutmaster who 
had molested some 300 victims. ld. 
50. Assembly Hearings, supra note 2, at 107 (testimony of Dr. Captane Thompson 
of the California Psychiatric Association). Doctor Thompson, in speaking of repeat of-
fender pedophiles, testified: 
I don't know of a specific treatment for a sexual psychopath 
.... If he's depressed, we can treat that. But if his propen-
sity to offend children or others is based on some personality 
quirk or disturbance, we don't have a specific treatment. And I 
think it would be more appropriate to treat him as you would 
any other offender. 
ld. at 107-08. 
51. Assembly Hearings, supra note 2, at 82 (testimony of Roland Summit, Los An-
geles County Dept. of Mental Health). 
52. Cal. A.B. 33 (1985-86). Existing law in California provides for a program of en-
hanced prosecution efforts for sexual offenders in general. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 999i-
999p (West Supp. 1985). Assembly Bill 33 is legislation aimed particularly at child abus-
ers (both physical and sexual). 
53. Vertical prosecutorial representation occurs when one prosecutor makes the ini-
tial filing or appearance in a case and subsequently makes all court appearances on that 
particular case through its conclusion, including the sentencing phase. Cal. A.B. 33, at 3 
(1985-86). 
54. A highly qualified investigator or prosecutor is defined in the bill as (1) individu-
als with one year of experience in the investigation and prosecution of sexual felonies, or 
(2) individuals who have received the special training set forth in Penal Code § 13836 
(training of sexual assault investigators), or (3) individuals who have attended a program 
providing equivalent training as approved by the Office of Cuminal Justice Planning. 
Cal. A.B. 33, at 3 (1985-86). 
55. Cal. A.B. 33, at 3 (1985-86). 
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fornia has stiffened sentences for child molestation convictions.1I6 
Several consecutive sentence enhancement provisions are also 
contained in the Penal Code directed to repeat offenders.1I7 The 
paradox of the pedophile, however, is that unless society is ready 
to incarcerate all child sexual abusers for life, the pedophile will 
return to society and seduce more children after his prison term 
has expired. liB With this in mind, California law requires that all 
convicted sex offenders (specifically including child molesters) 
register with the police upon entering a local jurisdiction with 
the intent to reside.1I9 Moreover, all relevant California Depart-
ment of Justice records concerning convicted sex offenders will 
be forwarded to requesting employers when such person "applies 
for employment or volunteers for a position in which he or she 
would have supervisory or disciplinary power over a minor."6o 
56. With t.he enactment of determinate sentencing in California in 1976, the sen-
tence for a section 288 violation was set at three, four, or five years. Act of Sept. 20, 1976, 
ch. 1139, § 177, 1976 Cal. Stat. 5110. This punishment was increased to three, five, or 
seven years in 1978. Act of Sept. 5, 1978, ch. 579, § 17,1978 Cal. Stat. 1984. Finally the 
legislature increased the punishment to three, six, or eight years in 1981. Act of Sept. 30, 
1981, ch. 1064, § I, 1981 Cal. Stat. 4093. 
57. Act of Sept. 30, 1981, ch. 1064, § 2, 1981 Cal. Stat. 4093 (codified at CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 667.51) (West Supp. 1985), provides for a five year enhancement for each prior 
conviction of specified sex offenses, including lewd and lascivious conduct on the body of 
a minor. [d. at subd. (a). The statute further provides that a conviction for child moles-
tation of a person who has served two or more prison terms for previous sex offenses is 
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for 15 years to life. [d. at subd. (c). A 
three year enhancement is also available if the perpetrator used a weapon against his 
victim (CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.3 (West Supp. 1985» or inflicted great bodily harm 
upon the victim (CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.7 (West Supp. 1985». See also People v. 
Lopez, 90 Cal. App. 3d 711, 721, 153 Cal. Rptr. 541, 546 (1979) (holding that multiple sex 
crimes against the same victim during the same incident may be separately punished). 
Although Lopez does not apply only to pedophiles, the punishment in appropriate cases 
can obviously be significantly increased if multiple sex crimes are committed. See, e.g., 
People v. Bestelmeyer, 166 Cal. App. 3d 520, 532, 212 Cal. Rptr. 605, 611-12 (1985) (con-
secutive prison terms totaling 129 years as punishment for the commission of 25 separate 
serious sex offenses is not cruel and unusual punishment). 
58. The pedophile will seduce more children because this is his sexual preference, 
for which there is no "cure." See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. The realiza-
tion that the pedophile might return to the streets spurred the legislature into establish-
ing an experimental treatment program for persons convicted of sex offenses against chil-
dren. Act of Sept. 29, 1982, ch. 1529, § I, 1982 Cal. Stat. 5951 (codified at CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1364) (West Supp. 1985). The Department of Mental Health is scheduled to 
submit an evaluation of this treatment program to the legislature in July, 1985. 
59. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(a) (West Supp. 1985). 
60. Act of Sept. 23, 1981, ch. 681, § 2, 1981 Cal. Stat. 2481 (codified at CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 11105.3) (West Supp. 1985). Since it is known that pedophiles tend to seek out 
employment or volunteer positions where they will be in contact with children, this stat-
ute provides such organizations as the Boy Scouts and the Big Brothers the opportunity 
to screen convicted child sexual abusers out of their hiring process. See also CAL. PENAL 
12
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B. Intrafamilial Sexual Abuse 
While mythology warns children about "the stranger with 
candy down the block," one expert estimates that upwards to 
eighty per cent of child sexual abuse victims know their adult 
abuser.61 Most of these cases involve "intrafamilial" abuse,62 
commonly sexual conduct between father and daughter.63 In 
contrast to a pedophile, a person without a prior history of sex-
ual problems can be tempted to sexually abuse a child in the 
intimacy of family life, especially at times of stress or poor adult 
relationships.64 However, there are social programs in California 
that deal particularly with intrafamilial sexual abuse cases.611 In 
contrast to a pedophile, an intrafamilial abuser (if he is not a 
pedophile by nature) can receive effective psychiatric treatment 
and cease to sexually abuse children.66 
CODE § 291 (West Supp. 1985), providing for the notification of a school district if one of 
its teachers is arrested for certain sex offenses. 
61. Child Molestation: Hearing before the California Joint Committee for Revision 
of the Penal Code (Dec. 16, 1980) (testimony of Dr. Carolyn Swift, Director of Preven-
tion Services at Southwest Community Mental Health Center, Columbus, Ohio). 
62. See supra note 12. 
63. See supra note 15. 
64. See Groth, Patterns of Sexual Assault against Children and Adolescents, in 
SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 3, 8 (A. Burgess, A. Groth, L. Holstrom, 
and S. Sgroi eds. 1978). Groth writes of the intrafamilial abuser as a "regressed 
pedophile." [d. at 8-9. "A regressed child offender is a person who originally preferred 
peers or adult partners for sexual gratification . . . . Typically this offender is married 
and a situation develops that threatens this relationship. Feeling overwhelmed by the 
resulting stress, this man becomes involved sexually with a child." [d. at 9 (emphasis 
omitted). 
65. See Cobey & Minzer, supra note 20, at 24-32, for a detailed description of one 
such comprehensive innovative program in California-the Santa Clara County Child 
Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (CSATP). The ideal treatment program under 
CSATP is applied in this order: 
a) individual counseling, particularly for the child and mother, 
. and later, the father; 
b) mother-child counseling; 
c) marital counseling, which becomes key treatment if the 
family wishes to be reunited; 
d) father-child counseling; 
e) family counseling; and 
o group counseling. 
[d. at 30. "Participation in the program is not an alternative to the criminal or juvenile 
justice processes .... Counseling and self-help are not enough. Simply stated, the in-
ternal changes that the parent must make are too painful and too frightening to be un-
dergone voluntarily." [d. at 28. 
66. See generally INNOVATIONS IN THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 
123-34 (J. Bulkley ed. 1981) for detailed descriptions of treatment programs that have 
been formed throughout the country. One such program, the Santa Clara County Child 
13
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Assuming that a treatment program is established in a par-
ticular county, the prosecution of an intrafamilial sexual abuse 
case may be undesirable. This is true not only because the 
abuser can receive effective therapy, but also because prosecu-
tion may prove counterproductive to the welfare of the child, 
who would have to testify against her father and witness the 
breaking up of her family.67 California statutory law recognizes 
the potential difference between the pedophile and the in-
trafamilial abuser. This is readily seen in the statute that forbids 
probation for virtually all sex offenses committed against a mi-
nor, but permits probation if the following three requirements 
are met: (1) the defendant is the victim's parent, (2) imprison-
ment of the defendant is not in the best interests of the child, 
and (3) rehabilitation of the defendant is feasible in a recognized 
treatment program.68 
III. EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS IN CHILD SEXUAL 
ABUSE CASES 
Once a prosecutor decides to proceed with the charges 
against an alleged child molester, he or she faces a myriad 
problems before obtaining a conviction. This section provides an 
overview of the difficulties facing both the prosecution and the 
defense, focusing on the evidentiary problems inherent in sexual 
abuse cases. 
Assuming that the child has reported the abuse within the 
applicable statute of limitations,69 the primary problem in prose-
Sexual Abuse Program (CSATP) reports an astoundingly low one percent recidivism rate 
among those offenders who finish the program. Cobey & Minzer, supra note 20, at 32. 
67. See supra note 31. 
68. Act of Sept. 30, 1981, ch. 1064, § 4, 1981 Cal. Stat. 4095 (codified at CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1203.066) (West Supp. 1985). 
69. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 800 (West Supp. 1985), establishing a six year statute of 
limitations for crimes that are potentially punishable by eight years or more in the state 
prison. This brings the following sex crimes within its ambit: lewd or lascivious conduct 
(CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 288(a)(b) (West Supp. 1985)); rape (CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 
Supp. 1985)); penetration by any foreign object (CAL. PENAL CODE § 289 (West Supp. 
1985)); oral copulation with a child 14 or under and more than 10 years younger than 
perpetrator (CAL. PENAL CODE § 288a(c) (West Supp. 1985)); and sodomy with a child 14 
or under and more than 10 years younger than perpetrator (CAL. PENAL CODE § 286(c) 
(West Supp. 1985)). Prosecution for less serious felonies (such as incest or unlawful sex-
ual intercourse) must be commenced within three years of the commission of the crime. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 801 (West Supp. 1985). Misdemeanor sex offense prosecutions must 
be commenced within a year after the crime allegedly occurred. CAL. PENAL CODE § 802 
14
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cuting a sexual abuse case is establishing the competency of the 
complaining witness, who is usually the only witness to the mo-
lestation.70 Although California competency law is relatively lib-
eral,71 some jurors may not believe the child complainant's word 
when compared to the defendant's denials.72 Hence, the issue of 
victim credibility is extremely important in child sexual abuse 
cases. Furthermore, corroboration of a victim's testimony is 
often necessary to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the alleged incident actually took place.73 This corrobora-
(West Supp. 1985). Because delays are likely to occur before a molestation is reported 
(see supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text), some prosecutions will inevitably be pre-
vented. See, e.g., People v. Gordon, 165 Cal. App. 3d 839, 852, 212 Cal. Rptr. 174, 182-83 
(1985) (prosecution for sodomy barred by statute after both victim and mother delayed 
in reporting abuse). Currently under consideration in the legislature are several bills 
which would toll the statute of limitations in child sexual abuse cases to the date when 
the victim "comes of age." See Cal. A.B. 2477 (1985-86) (tolling the statute of limitations 
on crimes committed on persons who are less than eighteen years old to that date when 
they turn eighteen); Cal. A.B. 1981 (1985-86) (tolling the statute until victim turns 
twenty one); Cal. S.B. 1304 (1985-86) (permitting prosecution to be commenced anytime 
up until the victim's twenty-fourth birthday if the victim was twelve or younger when 
the crime was committed). 
70. As is true with any sex crime, an act of child molestation is likely to be commit-
ted in private surroundings. If anyone does witness a molestation, it is often another 
child who herself is probably a victim of child sexual abuse. See, e.g., People v. Butler, 
249 Cal. App. 2d 799, 803, 57 Cal. Rptr. 798, 801 (1967) (five-year-old witnessed adult 
"playing nasties" with other children); People v. Crume, 61 Cal. App. 3d 803, 812, 132 
Cal. Rptr. 577, 582 (1976) (testimony of two sexual abuse victims uncorroborated except 
for one instance when one victim observed the defendant and other victim in an act of 
oral copulation). 
71. Under California law, "every person is qualified" to be a witness. CAL. EVID. 
CODE § 700 (West 1966). Thus, no child is refused the opportunity to testify merely 
because of age. Most states designate an age (usually 10 or 14) and presume that any 
.person above that age is competent to testify. Persons below this age must meet certain 
requirements before they may be declared competent. See Melton, Bulkley & Wulkan, 
Competency of Children as Witnesses, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW 125, 126 (J. 
Bulkley ed. 1982). The authors proceed to detail the variations on the age requirement 
for competency in the several states. [d. at 126-27. 
72. Some data indicate that the commonly heid belief that a fact finder would be 
biased toward a complainant in a child molestation case may not be true. See Lloyd, The 
Corroboration of Sexual Victimization of Children, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE 
LAW 103, 104 (J. Bulkley ed. 1982). The author cites data which indicate that the convic-
tion rate for sex offenses, including child molestation, is lower than the conviction rate 
for other offenses. [d. 
73. [d. at 105. In addition to helping meet this strong burden of proof, corroboration 
of any criminal act, including an act of child sexual abuse, is necessary in California 
before a defendant's extrajudicial statements can be allowed into evidence. People v. 
Ramirez, 91 Cal. App. 3d 132, 137, 153 Cal. Rptr. 789, 791 (1979). Moreover, corrobora-
tion of an act of sexual molestation may prevent an appellate court from overturning a 
jury's verdict because of insufficient evidence. See, e.g., People v. Williamson, 161 Cal. 
App. 3d 336, 340-41, 207 Cal. Rptr. 503, 505-06 (1984), where a total lack of corroborat-
15
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tion may take the form of medical evidence, expert testimony, 
out of court statements by the complainant, or evidence of prior 
sexual misconduct by the defendant. 
A. The Competency and Credibility of Child Witnesses 
1. Competency 
The threshold problem in prosecuting a child sexual abuse 
case is establishing the competency of the complaining witness. H 
Without the testimony of the complainant, it is difficult to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt the corpus delictP& of child molesta-
tion because there are seldom witnesses to the abusive act.76 
While the general rule in California is that "every person is 
qualified to be a witness"" concerning matters within their 
realm of personal knowledge,78 a witness must demonstrate 
before testifying that he or she can (1) express herself or himself 
ing evidence, coupled with the victim's inconsistent statements, led the appellate court 
to hold that no rational trier of fact could have convicted defendant. 
74. Pirro, supra note 33, at 9-9. 
75. The corpus delicti of a child sexual abuse case in California consists of: (1) a 
lewd and lascivious act being committed, (2) with the intent of arousing the sexual 
desires of the child or adult. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 288 (West Supp. 1985). The identity 
of the molester must also be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Houser, 85 
Cal. App. 2d 686, 694, 193 P.2d 937, 941 (1948) (question of strength or weakness of 
complainant's testimony as to identification was for jury to decide). The touching neces-
sary to constitute a lewd act upon a person may be done by the child victim on his or her 
own person, if such touching was done at the instigation of the accused. People v. Austin, 
111 Cal. App. 3d 110, 114, 168 Cal. Rptr. 401, 403 (1980). Whatever form it takes, some 
"touching" is necessary to commit the crime of child molestation; acts that are solicitous 
in nature constitute preparation only. Ct. People v. LaFontaine, 79 Cal. App. 3d 176, 
181-83, 144 Cal. Rptr. 729, 732-33 (1978) (acts of solicitation were not even sufficient to 
prove the crime of attempted lewd and lascivious conduct). 
76. See supra note 70. 
77. CAL. EVID. CODE § 700 (West 1966). The statute provides in whole: "Except as 
otherwise provided by statute, every person is qualified to be a witness and no person is 
disqualified to testify to any matter." [d. 
[d. 
78. CAL. EVID. CODE § 702 (West 1966). This statute provides: 
(a) Subject to Section 801, the testimony of a witness concern-
ing a particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal 
knowledge of the matter. Against the objection of a party, 
such personal knowledge must be shown before the witness 
may testify concerning the matter. 
(b) A witness' personal knowledge of a matter may be shown 
by any otherwise admissible evidence, including his own 
testimony. 
16
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and (2) understand the duty to tell the truth.79 Because all wit-
nesses are presumed competent,80 the defendant must request a 
voir dire examination to challenge the competency of a prospec-
tive witness.81 
Upon voir dire examination, the child's ability (or lack 
thereof) to communicate is usually apparent.82 Pre-verbal chil-
dren obviously cannot meet this preliminary requirement, which 
leads to the irony that society's most helpless victims are also 
helpless in the courtroom because they cannot accuse their mo-
lester.8s Without any convincing corroborating evidence of the 
sexual assault or identification of the perpetrator, suspected sex-
ual abuse cases involving pre-verbal children will likely go 
unprosecuted.8' 
79. CAL. EVID. CODE § 701 (West 1966). This statute disqualifies a person to be wit-
ness if he is either "incapable of expressing himself concerning the matter so as to be 
understood, either directly or through interpretation by one who can understand him" or 
"incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth." Id. See MCCORMICK 
ON EVIDENCE § 62 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]. Decisions 
concerning 'competency are left to the judge's good discretion and will be overturned on 
appeal only if there was an abuse of discretion. Id. See, e.g., People v. Berry, 260 Cal. 
App. 2d 649, 652, 67 Cal. Rptr. 312, 314-15 (1968) (no abuse of discretion occurred when 
judge found that each witness understood that she was under compulsion to tell the 
truth); People v. Bronson, 263 Cal. App. 2d 831, 838, 70 Cal. Rptr. 162, 166 (1968) (no 
abuse of discretion occurred when judge declared nine- and twelve-year-old witnesses 
competent to testify). 
80. CAL. EVID. CODE § 700 (West 1966). 
81. People v. Berry, 260 Cal. App. 2d 649, 652, 67 Cal. Rptr. 312, 314 (1968) (it was 
not incumbent upon judge to conduct a voir dire of a prospective six-year-old witness). 
However, if a request for a voir dire is made by either party and is denied by the trial 
judge, an abuse of discretion may have been committed. See, e.g., Bradburn v. Peacock, 
135 Cal. App. 2d 161, 163-64, 286 P.2d 972, 973 (1955) (reversible error to preclude a 
child from testifying without conducting a voir dire examination to determine his compe-
tency when counsel offered to prove such). 
82. A child who clearly has no verbal skills would not even reach the voir dire stage 
of the examination because the prosecutor would have realized that the child was "inca-
pable of expressing himself ... so as to be understood .... " CAL. EVID. CODE § 701 
(West 1966). 
83. The use of "anatomically correct dolls" could prove to be of value in cases in-
volving victims who are pre-verbal. This has already occurred at a child dependency 
hearing, where the court held that a child's conduct during "play therapy" with anatomi-
cally correct dolls was nonassertive and therefore, not hearsay. In re Cheryl H. v. L.A. 
County Dep't of Pub. Social Services, 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 1126-27,200 Cal. Rptr. 789, 
807 -08 (1984) (non-hearsay evidence of a child's play with anatomically correct dolls ad-
missible because relevant (1) to prove allegation in petition that child was molested, and 
(2) as supplying part of the basis for doctor's opinion to the same effect). Id. at 1127-28, 
200 Cal. Rptr. at 808. 
84. Fortunately, the prevalence of sexual abuse is lowest in the under four age 
group, where the child is more likely to be pre-verbal (compared to the 5-8, 9-12, and 13-
17
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A child's ability to differentiate truth from falsehood is 
among the most litigated of witness competency issues in Cali-
fornia. 811 California courts do not require children to have any 
detailed knowledge of the nature of an oath.86 The statutory 
truthfulness test is satisfied when a child fears that some earthly 
evil will result from a lie being told in court.87 For example, it 
was sufficient for one child to state on voir dire examination that 
he would be sent to reform school if he did not tell the truth;88 
in another case, anticipation of a mother's spanking was suffi-
cient to convince a judge that a child would tell the truth while 
tes tifying. 89 
2. Credibility 
Even if a child sexual abuse complainant90 satisfies the legal 
competency requirements, the prosecution must still convince 
the trier of fact that the child is telling the truth while testify-
ing. The issue of credibility decides many close cases where 
there is no medical or eyewitness evidence to corroborate the 
victim's claim that he or she was sexually abused.91 
The general rule on credibility in California is that a trier of 
15 age groups). CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 13. While the high-
est incidence of physical abuse occurs in the under four group, evidence establishing the 
corpus delicti of child abuse is usually more readily available (e.g. bruises, welts, broken 
bones) than in the typical sexual abuse prosecution, where there are more likely to be no 
physical manifestations of the assault. See infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
85. See, e.g., People v. Lamb, 121 Cal. App. 2d 838, 841, 264 P.2d 126, 128 (1953) 
(petitioner challenged competency of three children ages nine, six, and five); People v. 
Elroy, 94 Cal. App. 355, 355, 271 P. 346, 346 (1928) (appellant challenged competency of 
nine-year-old victim); People v. Reeves, 128 Cal. App. 2d 410, 412, 275 P.2d 158, 159 
(1954) (defendant claimed court abused discretion in permitting six-year-old girl to tes-
tify); People v. Farley, 90 Cal. App. 3d 851, 868, 153 Cal. Rptr. 695, 704 (1979) (defen-
dant contended that ten-year-old witness incompetent to testify). 
86. People v. Lamb, 121 Cal. App. 2d 838, 845, 264 P.2d 126, 130 (1953). Further-
more, a religious belief or conviction was not required for a child under ten years of age 
to qualify as a witness. Id. 
87.Id. 
88. People v. Elroy, 94 Cal. App. 355, 356, 271 P. 346, 346 (1928) (nine-year-old 
child found competent to testify). 
89. People v. Reeves, 128 Cal. App. 2d 410, 412-13, 275 P.2d 158, 159 (1954) (no 
abuse of discretion in trial court's permitting six-year-old child to testify). 
90. The same rules that apply to complainants in sexual abuse cases apply to all 
children who witness acts of abuse, as well. As noted above, it is not uncommon for the 
only witnesses to a molestation to be children. See supra note 70. 
91. Issues concerning the defendant's credibility, often tied into the commission of 
past offenses, are discussed below. See infra notes 244-75 and accompanying text. 
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fact92 may consider "any matter that has any tendency in reason 
to prove or disprove the truthfulness of [a witness'] testimony at 
the hearing. "93 Among the credibility factors that a trier of fact 
may consider are the witness' character for honesty, the witness' 
demeanor, the existence of a bias or motive that may influence a 
witness' testimony, the extent of the witness' capacity to recol-
lect, and any inconsistent statement made previously by a 
witness.9• 
All of these factors take on an even greater significance 
when the witness is a child. California courts have long believed 
that children have "impressionable and plastic minds"91i and a 
common defense to child molestation charges is that the child is 
fabricating a tale of sexual abuse.96 Even advocates of liberaliz-
ing the requirements of child competency concede that young 
children are vulnerable to adult influence,97 raising the possibil-
ity that a sexual abuse charge could result from a divorce or 
child custody proceeding involving combatting parents.9S In ad-
92. While the judge decides competency issues, the trier of fact decides all issues of 
credibility. See MCCORMICK, supra note 79, at §§ 33-50, detailing the lines of attack on 
the credibility of a witness. If a witness decides credibility issues for the jury (whether or 
not a certain person is telling the truth), then an abuse of the judge's discretion may 
have occurred in permitting the witness to testify to the same. See, e.g., People v. Alva, 
90 Cal. App. 3d 418, 426, 427, 153 Cal. Rptr. 644, 649 (1979) (evidence supported the 
conclusion of the court that the effect of expert testimony in question would be to usurp 
the jury's function of determining credibility). 
93. CAL. EVID. CODE § 780 (West 1966). 
94. [d. In addition to these factors, section 780 also mentions the following as rele-
vant to a witness' credibility: the extent of the witness' opportunity to perceive any mat-
ter about which he testifies, the character of his testimony, a statement previously made 
by him that is consistent with his testimony at the hearing, and the existence or nonexis-
tence of any fact testified to by him. [d. 
95. People v. Delaney, 52 Cal. App. 765, 774, 199 P. 896, 900 (1921) (trial court's 
denial of appellant's counsel opportunity to voir dire child witness constituted abuse of 
discretion). [d. at 775-76, 199 P. at 901. 
96. See, e.g., People v. Deletto, 147 Cal. App. 3d 458, 463, 195 Cal. Rptr. 233, 235 
(1983) (part of defense was that the minor's foster mothers had participated in 
fabricating the minor's testimony in order to gain custody of her); People v. Belasco, 125 
Cal. App. 3d 974, 979, 178 Cal. Rptr. 461, 463 (1981) (defendant implied theory of 
fabrication by complainant through testimony concerning disagreements with stepdaugh-
ter over her boyfriend, a large dog, and her report card). 
97. Melton, Bulkley & Wulkan, supra note 71, at 138. "[T]here is some confirmation 
of the cognitive-developmental prediction of high vulnerability to adult influence among 
young children." [d. 
98. See, e.g., People v. Fritts, 72 Cal. App. 3d 319, 326, 140 Cal. Rptr. 94, 97-99 
(1977) (defendant attempted to introduce evidence that mother offered to drop charges 
if defendant would waive all custody rights and relinquish all community property). 
The fact that children are capable of fabricating a story about sexual abuse, whether 
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dition to this "suggestibility" factor, courts (and jurors) often 
perceive children as capable of fantasizing about sexual en-
counters,99 although recent research indicates that the opposite 
is likely to be true. 100 
These considerations, coupled with the limited availability 
of evidence sufficient to convict a defendant,lOl have led the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court to unanimously hold that the "broadest 
latitude in cross-examination and production of rebuttal evi-
dence is required" in prosecutions for child molestation. l02 The 
under parental influence or not, came to light recently in Jordan, Minnesota. Twenty-
four adults were charged in 1983·84 with sexually abusing children in that city. L.A. 
Times, Dec. 29, 1984, at I, col. 4. The first two defendants to come to trial were acquit-
ted and the charges against the other defendants were subsequently dropped. [d. One of 
the therapists who worked with the children in Jordan (and believed their accusations) 
has stated: 
I've been getting hoax type cases recently. . . . My colleagues 
are all saying the same. Lots are connected to custody cases 
where an ex-husband or new boyfriend gets accused. I think 
people are learning its a very effective weapon. We have four 
cases right now in our clinic that I think are false. 
[d. at 26, col. 1. 
Douglas J. Besharov, a former prosecutor in New York and current visiting scholar 
at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, said the following: 
[d. 
When I started in this field 15 years ago, there was no one 
reporting even the most grievous cases. As a prosecutor in 
New York, I was part of a small group pushing to have fuller 
reporting. Now the world has changed discernibly and it's fair 
to say it's gone too far the other way. The tremendous atten-
tion paid by the news media is one reason. From spending 
hours on state hot lines, I can tell you, there's a lot of junk 
coming in. My wife, who is a social worker, knows an ll-year-
old girl who made abuse reports in three foster homes. The 
girl told my wife, 'I got three now. I can do what I want.' 
99. Lloyd, supra note 72, at 105. 
100. [d. at 105-06. In discussing the likelihood of a child fantasizing about a sexual 
encounter, Lloyd states: 
Since knowledge through observation or hearing is the basis 
for fantasy, children are unlikely to fantasize about sexual ac-
tivity using adult terms because sexual matters are not gener-
ally discussed between parents and their children in an in-
formative way. The child who can describe an adult's erect 
penis and ejaculation has had direct experience with them. 
[d. at 105 (citation omitted). 
101. The complainant's testimony by itself is legally sufficient for conviction in Cali-
fornia. People v. Scott. 21 Cal. 3d 284, 296, 578 P.2d 123, 129, 145 Cal. Rptr. 876, 882 
(1978) (uncorroborated testimony of a single witness was sufficient to sustain a convic-
tion, unless the testimony was physically impossible or inherently improbable). 
102. People v. Clark, 63 Cal. 2d 503, 504-05, 407 P.2d 294, 295, 47 Cal. Rptr. 382, 
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court also held that while the general rule in California forbids 
admission of specific wrongful acts to attack a witness' charac-
ter,103 this rule is inapplicable when a basic fact is in issue, such 
as a defense based on a motive to fabricate. l04 Buttressing this 
common law is a provision of the California Evidence Code 
which permits a defendant to offer into evidence specific in-
stances of a victim's conduct to prove that the victim acted in 
conformity with such conduct at the time in question. 1011 In in-
terpreting this statute, one California appellate court found er-
ror in a trial court's refusal to admit testimony that a complain-
ant had twice falsely complained of being a crime victim.loe 
383 (1965). See also People v. Blagg, 267 Cal. App. 2d 598, 608-09, 73 Cal. Rptr. 93, 100 
(1968) (impeachment methods in sex cases were much more liberal, and broad cross-
examination of the prosecuting witness or prior sexual experience, fabrication, and sex-
ual fantasy should be allowed). While the holding in Blagg, as far as fabrication, is prob-
ably still good law, the holding with regards to the witness' sex life has been modified 
(for certain sex crimes) by subsequent statutory law. See infra notes 110-11 and accom-
panying text. 
103. CAL. EVID. CODE § 787 (West 1966) (stating that subject to the statute that 
permits impeachment by evidence of past conviction, "evidence of specific instances of 
this conduct relevant only as tending to prove a trait of his character is inadmissible to 
attack or support the credibility of a witness." [d. (emphasis added). 
104. People v. Clark, 63 Cal. 2d 503, 505, 407 P.2d 294, 295, 47 Cal. Rptr. 382, 383 
(1965). The following facts in Clark raised the distinct possibility that the complainant 
was fabricating the accusation against her stepfather in order to be permitted to live 
with her natural father: (1) an older sister had five years previously filed charges against 
defendant, who was later acquitted; (2) the complainant revealed accusations only after a 
long talk with her older sister at her natural father's home; (3) the complainant had a 
reputation for lying; and (4) no medical evidence, such as bleeding, was discovered de-
spite the fact that complainant testified that defendant had "fully penetrated her" on 
three occasions. With all of the above evidence in mind, the court considered the evi-
dence which rebutted complainant's claim that she never had any past sexual exper-
iences as relevant. [d. at 506-07, 407 P.2d at 295-96, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 383-84. 
105. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985). However, character evidence 
indicating conforming conduct is not admissible on the issue of "consent," which may 
arise if the accused molester is charged with rape. [d. at subd.(b)(l). If the defendant 
does offer character evidence to show that the victim acted in conformity on a relevant 
occasion, the prosecution may rebut this evidence. [d. at subd.(a)(2). 
106. People v. Randle, 130 Cal. App. 3d 286, 295-96, 181 Cal. Rptr. 745, 750 (1982) 
(trial court erred in not allowing evidence that the victim had falsely complained of be-
ing a victim of a purse snatching and of having been kidnapped). See also People v. 
Wall, 95 Cal. App. 3d 978, 989, 157 Cal. Rptr. 587, 594 (1979) (in prosecution for rape, 
trial court erred in excluding testimony of boyfriend that complainant had threatened to 
make a false accusation of rape against him). The Wall court's reliance on Evidence 
Code section 1103(a) has met with criticism. See People v. Jones, 155 Cal. App. 3d 153, 
183,202 Cal. Rptr. 162,179 (1984), where the court cited the Law Revision Commission's 
comment that Evidence Code section 1101 was not intended to refer to character-trait 
evidence offered to prove a fact relating to the credibility of a witness. [d. Rather, the 
admissibility of character-trait evidence is determined by Evidence Code section 787, 
which forbids specific instances of conduct when offered only to attack a witness' charac-
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Although a defendant generally has freedom to inquire into 
the possibility of a motive to fabricate, the trial courts possess 
broad discretion to limit cross-examination of a complainant. lo7 
In essence, trial courts must determine whether there are facts 
indicating that complainant might be fabricating: "fishing expe-
ditions" will not suffice. lOB For example, one court refused to al-
low testimony regarding a divorce proceeding between complain-
ant's parents because such evidence was "far afield from the 
issue of appellant's guilt on the criminal charges."lo9 The Cali-
fornia Legislature has also codified strict procedures to follow 
whenever evidence of a sexual assault victim's past sex life is 
offered by the defense on the issue of the complainant's credibil-
ityYo While these procedures apply only to certain sex crimes,lll 
they apply to both adults and children and effectively limit po-
ter. Id. The Jones court did approve of the admission of evidence concerning the victim's 
reputation for dishonesty (Id. at 184, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 179), but the holding failed to 
address the fact that the defendant's defense was based on a theory of victim fabrication. 
The defendant's right to put on a full defense could be hampered if courts use the ban 
against the admission of specific instances of conduct (to prove credibility) in section 787 
as a ban against specific instances offered to prove facts crucial to the defense. Many 
child sexual abuse cases hinge on the credibility of the complaining witness and the de-
fendant must be offered a full and fair opportunity to attack a victim's credibility if the 
situation warrants. 
107. People v. Fritts, 72 Cal. App. 3d 319, 326, 140 Cal. Rptr. 94, 97-98 (1977) (trial 
judge has broad discretion to keep cross-examination of a complainant in a sex offense 
case within reasonable bounds). 
108. See, e.g., People v. Pacheco, 220 Cal. App. 2d 320, 323, 33 Cal. Rptr. 737, 737 
(1963) (defendant unsuccessful in attempt to impeach eight-year-old complainant by 
showing that complainant had previously undressed a little girl). "The incident ... did 
not come within the rule permitting interrogation with respect to prior false reports." Id. 
109. People v. Fritts, 72 Cal. App. 3d 319, 326, 140 Cal. Rptr. 94, 98 (1977). The 
court in Fritts also forbade defense counsel to inquire into victim's sexual relations with 
her boyfriend, stating: "In incest and child molestation the victim's sexual experience 
has no direct relevance to the issue, and the court correctly protected the victim from 
exploratory questions in that area." Id. at 327, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 98. 
110. Act of Sept. 24, 1981, ch. 726, § I, 1981 Cal. Stat. 2876 (codified at CAL. EVID. 
CODE § 782(a», expanded the former statute to include the crimes of sodomy, lewd or 
lascivious conduct, and penetration with a foreign object. The procedures in section 782 
call for (1) a written motion from the defense that it has an offer of proof of the relll-
vancy of the evidence, accompanied by affidavit stating the offer of proof, (2) a hearing 
outside the presence of the jury, where complainant is to be questioned about the offer of 
proof, (3) the court's finding that the evidence is relevant pursuant to Evidence Code 
section 780 (see supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text) and is not inadmissible pur-
suant to Evidence Code section 352 (see infra note 260), and (4) the court's issuing an 
order stating what evidence may be introduced and the nature of the questions to be 
permitted. Id. 
111. CAL. EVID. CODE § 782(a) (West Supp. 1985). The crimes specifically mentioned 
in this section are rape, sodomy, oral copulation, penetration with a foreign object, and 
aiding or abetting rape or penetration with a foreign object. Id. 
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tentially traumatic testimony for the child. 112 
The flipside of attacking a victim's credibility through evi-
dence of his or her sexual experiences is to offer evidence of a 
defendant's past sexual activities to support the credibility of 
the complaining witness. Prior to 1978, several California courts 
suggested that evidence of prior sex offenses was always admissi-
ble to corroborate a complainant's testimony. 11 3 In 1978 in Peo-
ple v. Thomas, the California Supreme Court disapproved of 
these cases and established the rule that evidence of prior sexual 
acts by a defendant is admissible as corroborating a victim's 
testimony only when such evidence is independently admissible 
to prove a fact in controversy such as intent, identity, or com-
mon scheme. 114 
The Thomas rule makes much sense in that an absolute 
"support of the witness" rule of admissibility would emasculate 
the long established rule against the admissibility of character 
evidence. lUi To prejudice a defendant with such evidence would 
virtually assure that a jury would convict a defendant regardless 
of the evidence concerning the act in controversy. Child molesta-
tion cases are highly inflammatory by nature and efforts to add 
to this volatility must be avoided if we are to maintain an equi-
. table system of criminal justice. 
The area of expert testimony has long been a controversial 
focal point on issues relating to a person's credibility in sex of-
fense cases. In a widely quoted passage, Professor Wigmore 
stated that "[n]o judge should ever let a sex offense charge go to 
112. See supra note 109. 
113. See, e.g., People v. Creighton, 57 Cal. App. 3d 314, 325, 129 Cal. Rptr. 249, 255 
(1976) (testimony by victim's sister of uncharged sex offenses admissible as supporting 
victim's credibility only); People v. Covert, 249 Cal. App. 2d 81, 88, 57 Cal. Rptr. 220, 
225 (1967) (the implicit challenge to the credibility of complainant created relevance for 
evidence of similar sex acts upon other persons). 
114. People v. Thomas, 20 Cal. 3d 457, 468·69, 573 P.2d 433, 439, 143 Cal. Rptr. 215, 
221 (1978) (testimony by defendant's daughter of abusive episodes ten to eighteen years 
in the past held inadmissible as evidence of a "common scheme," hence, evidence was 
not admissible to support credibility of complainants). Accord People v. Thompson, 98 
Cal. App. 3d 467, 481, 159 Cal. Rptr. 615, 624 (1979) (prosecution presented no "tenable 
theory" to prove that past conduct independently admissible to prove "common scheme 
or plan," therefore, witness corroboration theory did not attach). 
115. People v. Thomas, 20 Cal. 3d 457, 468·69, 573 P.2d 433, 439, 143 Cal. Rptr. 215, 
221 (1978). 
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a jury unless the female complainant's social history and medi-
cal makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified 
physician."116 Following the archaic thinking of men like Wig-
more, the common law rule in California prior to 1981 was that a 
judge could compel a complainant in a sex related case to sub-
mit to psychiatric examination.1l7 In order to admit the results 
of such an examination, the evidence had to establish that the 
complainant was suffering from a particular mental or emotional 
condition that affected her ability to tell the truth concerning 
the incident in question. liS Only then would the testimony be of 
any aid to the jury, which must ultimately decide if the com-
plainant was telling the truth concerning the incident in 
question. 119 
Overruling prior common law, the California Legislature in 
1981 passed a statute whereby a trial court "[s]hall not order 
any prosecuting witness, or a victim in any sexual assault prose-
cution to submit to a psychiatric or psychological examination 
for the purpose of assessing his or her credibility."12o This stat-
116. 3A WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 924(a), at 737 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). 
117. See, e.g., Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159,176-77,410 P.2d 838, 849, 
49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 313 (1966) (trial judge authorized to order psychiatric examination if 
circumstances indicate necessity); People v. Russell, 69 Cal. 2d 187, 194, 443 P.2d 794, 
800, 70 Cal. Rptr. 210, 215-16 (1968) (court must decide if psychiatric testimony will aid 
trier of fact in assessing witness credibility). The judge's sound discretion decided (1) 
whether the complaining witness must submit to psychiatric examination, and (2) 
whether the examining psychiatrist's testimony was admissible. Ballard, 64 Cal. 2d at 
176-77,410 P.2d at 849, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 313. Subsequent cases narrowly interpreted the 
power a court had to force a complainant to submit to the exam. See, e.g., People v. 
Mills, 87 Cal. App. 3d 302, 308, 151 Cal. Rptr. 71, 74 (1978), which limited the appropri-
ate sanctions for a complainant's refusal to submit to an examination to: (1) a comment 
to the jury on the refusal to cooperate, or perhaps (2) disallowance of the complainant's 
testimony. [d. The Mills court went on to hold that the trial judge abused his discretion 
when he dismissed the case because of complainant's refusal to submit to the examina-
tion. [d. at 309, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 75. 
118. People v. Russel, 69 Cal. 2d 187, 196,443 P.2d 794, 801, 70 Cal. Rptr. 210, 216-
17. See, e.g., People v. Alva, 90 Cal. App. 3d 418, 427, 153 Cal. Rptr. 644, 649 (1979) 
(because examination revealed no particular mental or emotional condition, trial court 
properly refused to admit testimony from examining psychiatrist). 
119. People v. Russell, 69 Cal. 2d 187, 196,443 P.2d 794, 801, 70 Cal. Rptr. 210, 217 
(1968). In addition to the "mental condition" requirement and the "preserving the integ-
rity of the jury" requirement, the Russell court mentioned two factors that a judge must 
consider in deciding whether or not to admit the expert testimony of the examining psy-
chiatrist: (1) whether the knowledge which the testimony represents can be effectively 
communicated to a jury, and (2) whether the examination utilized techniques of general 
scientific acceptance. [d. 
120. Act of Feb. 25, 1980, ch. 16, § I, 1980 Cal. Stat. 63 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE 
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ute has been interpreted as banning only the power of the judge 
to order a psychiatric examination and does not affect the rele-
vancy or admissibility of such evidence.121 
Did the legislature act properly to deny trial courts the 
power to order a psychiatric examination? California courts have 
consistently rejected attempts to impeach prosecution witnesses 
with expert testimony in non-sex cases122 and there is no reason 
to believe that a sex offense complainant is more likely to be a 
liar than a non-sex offense complainant.123 Furthermore, any 
witness, young or old, is subject to impeachment through prior 
inconsistent statements, reputation evidence for truthfulness, 
and cross-examination. Forbidding the trial judge from ordering 
a complainant to undergo a psychiatric examination supports 
the policy that "the victim of a sex crime should not unnecessa-
rily be subjected to further harassment or distress in criminal 
proceedings against her alleged violator."124 
3. Conclusion 
The competency laws in California are justifiably liberal in 
permitting children to testify, although it could be argued that 
§ 1112 (West Supp. 1985». 
121. See People v. Hagerman, 164 Cal. App. 3d 967, 973, 210 Cal. Rptr. 504, 507 
(1985). In this recent case, the issue arose whether Penal Code section 1112 survived the 
subsequently enacted state initiative Proposition 8, which altered the state constitution 
to read that subject to specific exceptions "relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any 
criminal proceeding .... " CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28, subd. (d). The court in Hagerman 
held that a close reading of Ballard supported the distinction between the court's power 
to order a psychiatric examination and the court's power to admit or exclude psychiatric 
testimony. Hagerman, 164 Cal. App. 3d at 973, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 507. "In passing Penal 
Code section 1112 in 1980 the Legislature overruled the holding in Ballard only with 
regard to the first step [citation) but did not purport to act with regard to the second 
step concerning the admissibility of psychiatric testimony .... " Id. at 974, 210 Cal. 
Rptr. at 507. 
122. See, e.g., People v. Guzman, 47 Cal. App. 3d 380, 385-86, 121 Cal. Rptr. 69, 71-
72 (1975) (in prosecution for murder, no abuse of discretion occurred when trial judge 
refused to admit into evidence defense's expert testimony concerning misidentification 
issue). See also People v. Johnson, 38 Cal. App. 3d 1,7,112 Cal. Rptr. 834, 837 (1974) (in 
prosecution for robbery, assault, and murder, trial court's ruling that psychologist's ex-
pert testimony would take over jury's task of determining weight of evidence was well 
within the court's range of discretion). 
123. The California Supreme Court appears to have accepted this statement as fact. 
See, e.g., People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 883, 538 P.2d 247, 260, 123 Cal. Rptr. 
119, 132 (1975) (those who made accusations of sexual misconduct were no less credible 
than any other class of complainants). 
124. People v. Mills, 87 Cal. App. 3d 302, 307, 151 Cal. Rptr. 71, 74 (1978). 
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the requirement of understanding the difference between a lie 
and telling the truth is too restrictive. Even if competent to tes-
tify, however, a child still faces credibility problems when he or 
she testifies about an incident of sexual abuse. The possibility of 
fabrication undoubtedly exists in molestation cases, just as it 
does in non-sexual criminal complaints, but a proper offer of 
proof can lead to admission of evidence on this issue. Recent 
legislation will help children to overcome some of their inherent 
credibility problems. For example, criminal cases involving mi-
nors as material witnesses are given priority on criminal court 
calendars so that the memory of the child will be relatively fresh 
when he or she testifies. 1211 Leading questions on direct examina-
tion is now statutorily permitted in some sexual abuse cases in 
the hope that the judicious use of such questions can help the 
child fully describe the molestation.126 These changes rightfully 
focus on child sexual abuse victims and reflect an effort to re-
move some of the inherent handicaps which burden child wit-
nesses. Such laws are also in direct contrast to the pre-Thomas 
line of cases, which reflected an effort to convict child molesters 
by admitting prejudicial evidence to support the credibility of 
the complainant. 
B. Corroborating Evidence 
Until the 1960's, the common law required the corrobora-
tion of any sex crime, regardless of the victiIp.'s age.127 In re-
sponse to lobbying efforts, most states have since repealed stat-
utes requiring corroboration for rape complaints as well as for 
complaints of child sexual abuse.12s Today, California does not 
require corroboration of an act of sexual molestation; the com-
125. Act of Sept. 25, 1984, ch. 1423, § 6, 1984 Cal. Stat. _ (codified at CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1048(b» (West Supp. 1985). This statute provides in pertinent part: "[AJll crimi-
nal actions in which a minor is detained as a material witness, or in which the minor is 
the victim of the alleged offense ... shall be given precedent over all other criminal 
actions in the order of trial." [d. 
126. Act of Sept. 25, 1984, ch. 1423, § I, 1984 Stat. _ (codified at CAL. EVID. CODE 
§ 767(b) (West Supp. 1985): "The court may in the interests of justice permit a leading 
question to be asked of a child under 10 years of age in a case involving a prosecution of 
child abuse or child molestation." [d. 
127. Pirro, supra note 33, at 9-21. The author notes that only in the wake of 
Sigmund Freud's theories were women and children viewed as hysterical persons who 
made charges of rape based on their fantasies. This belief was responsible for the enact-
ment of corroboration statues in most states. [d. 
128. [d. 
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plain ant's testimony is sufficient to establish the corpus delicti 
of the crime. I29 
Although legally it is no longer necessary to corroborate a 
child's testimony, compelling reasons remain for the continued 
use of corroborating evidence: (1) to overcome societal myths 
surrounding the sexual victimization of children, and (2) to 
avoid appellate reversal of a conviction based on insufficient evi-
dence. I3o Ideally, the most successful corroboration comes from 
an eyewitness or the defendant, but these sources of corrobora-
tion are often not available. lSI The prosecution must then rely 
on medical evidence, expert testimony, hearsay evidence, or evi-
dence of past sexual misconduct by a defendant to ensure that 
guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
1. Medical/Behavioral Evidence 
If medical and/or scientific evidence is available in a child 
molestation prosecution, it is much easier to convince a jury that 
a molestation has occurred. Although physical trauma is often 
not apparent on the person of a child sexual abuse victim,IS2 
when present, evidence such as abrasions, bruising, or swelling 
do provide corroboration of a child's testimony concerning a 
lewd act. California requires only marginal relevancy of such 
physical evidence. The possibility that the physical trauma 
originated from a source other than the defendant will merely 
affect the weight of the evidence. ISS Proof of a victim's preg-
129. See supra note 101. 
130. Lloyd, supra note 72, at 103. See also People v. Williamson, 161 Cal. App. 3d 
336, 340-41, 207 Cal. Rptr. 503, 505-06 (1984), which overturned a rape conviction be-
cause of the lack of medical corroboration and the seventeen-year-old complainant's in-
consistent statements. 
131. See supra note 70. 
132. Lloyd, supra note 72, at 108. There may be no trauma "if the child alleges that 
only fondling ... occurred or if the perpetrator induced the child to participate by 
threat of force, bribery, misrepresentation of moral standards, seductive flattery, or by 
intoxication of the child." [d. (footnote omitted). See also Burgess & Holmstrom, Sexual 
Trauma of Children and Adolescents: Pressure, Sex, And Secrecy, in THE SEXUAL VIC-
TIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 67, 72-73 (L. Schultz ed. 1980) (suggesting several reasons why a 
child may delay in reporting a sexual abuse incident: fear of punishment, fear of reper-
cussions from telling, fear of rejection, and communication barriers that children some-
times have). It is obviously more difficult to obtain any medical or physical evidence if a 
substantial time period has passed between the incident and the examination. 
133. See, e.g., People v. Worthington, 38 Cal. App. 3d 359, 366, 113 Cal. Rptr. 322, 
326 (1974) (possibility that swelling of anus was caused by attempted anal intercourse 
was a matter for the jury to determine). 
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nancy is generally admissible since it is relevant in establishing 
the corpus delicti of any sexual abuse charge involving sexual 
intercourse.134 
Physical trauma aside, the presence of spermatozoa or semi-
nal fluid on the bodyl311 or clothing136 of a child provides evi-
dence of recent sexual activity. However, the absence of such 
fluid generally has no evidentiary value.137 Seminal fluid in the 
vaginal tract of the victim establishes penetration,138 which is a 
crucial element to the corpus delicti of rape, incest, or unlawful 
sexual intercourse. 
Both saliva and semen produce minute portions of blood 
that can be "typed."139 The admissibility of blood type evidence 
is a controversial issue in criminal cases because such evidence 
only narrows the pool of potential suspects down to a large seg-
ment of the population.140 Accordingly, a few states do not per-
mit evidence that the blood type from semen found on a child's 
134. People v. Stoll, 84 Cal. App. 99, 101, 257 P. 583, 583-84 (1927). While evidence 
of a victim's pregnancy is generally admissible, this is not necessarily true in all in-
stances. In Stoll, for example, the evidence of pregnancy did not tend to prove the 
corpus delicti of incest because the time that the doctor said that conception occurred 
and the time that the alleged incident took place were not the same. [d. at 101, 257 P. at 
584. 
135. People v. Orduno, 80 Cal. App. 3d 738, 742, 145 Cal. Rptr. 806, 808 (1978), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1978) (spermatozoa found on the child's skin in the vaginal area). 
136. People v. Clark, 104 Cal. App. 2d 634, 638, 232 P.2d 290, 292 (1951) (victim's 
and defendant's stained clothing admissible). 
137. Pirro, supra note 33, at 9-45-46. The author explains: 
[d. at 9-46. 
138. [d. 
Many sex offenders are sexually dysfunctional during the act, 
and are thus unable to ejaculate. In some cases there may be 
very little sperm to ejaculate or in others the penis may be 
withdrawn prior tp ejaculation. Seminal fluid, however, can be 
blood typed, since some people secrete minute portions of 
blood in other fluids." 
139. Moenssens, Moses & Inbau, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 255 (1973). 
140. See, e.g., People v. Vallez, 80 Cal. App. 3d 46, 56, 143 Cal. Rptr. 914, 920 (1978) 
(evidence that semen stains on victim's nightgown were from a man with type A blood 
was both relevant and admissible in prosecution of defendant with type A blood even 
though 40% of the world's population had the same blood type). Less controversial than 
blood typing is the typing of pubic hairs that may be found on a sexual abuse victim, as 
such evidence potentially links the defendant directly to the victim. See, e.g., People v. 
Hagerman, 164 Cal. App. 3d 967, 971, 210 Cal. Rptr. 504, 506 (1985) (laboratory expert 
noted positive microscopic comparison between pubic hairs found on the victims and 
those on the defendant). 
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person or clothes is the same as that of the defendant,141 al-
though such evidence is generally admissible if the blood type 
does not match that of the defendant.142 However, in California 
and most states, evidence matching the blood type of defendant 
with the blood type found in the semen is relevant and admissi-
ble.143 As with physical trauma evidence, the weight given to 
blood type evidence is a matter for the jury to decide in light of 
all the facts. 1'" California courts do require that blood typing be 
used only as corroborating evidence to support "some additional, 
independent evidence tending to show either (1) that the man 
who committed the crime did lose blood in the process, or (2) 
that the defendant was present at the scene."1411 
The presence of a sexually transmitted disease also cor-
roborates sexual activity.146 However, if a physician examines a 
sexually abused child shortly after a molestation and identifies a 
venereal disease, this does not necessarily corroborate the parti-
cular sexual act in question because most venereal diseases have 
incubation periods of at least several days.147 The presence of 
the venereal disease only indicates that the victim had been in-
volved in prior sexual activity, and such evidence may not be 
141. Iowa and New York are two such states. See, e.g., State v. Peterson, 219 
N.W.2d 665, 671-72 (1974); People v. Robinson, 27 N.Y.2d 864, 865, 265 N.E.2d 543, 543, 
317 N.Y.S.2d 19, 19-20 (1970). 
142. Evidence that blood taken from a molestation does not match the blood type of 
defendant is relevant in any defense of misidentification. Although criminal case law on 
this issue is non-existent, in the paternity area blood type evidence is only admissible 
when its effect is to exclude the defendant as the possible father of the child. Hodge v. 
Gould, 274 Cal. App. 2d 806, 808, 79 Cal. Rptr. 245, 246 (1969). "Blood tests may be used 
to exclude a defendant as the possible father of a child, but no inference or presumption 
of paternity arise from the mere fact that such tests fail to exclude him." [d. 
143. People v. Lindsey, 84 Cal. App. 3d 851, 866, 149 Cal. Rptr. 47, 56 (1978) (citing 
overwhelming number of jurisdictions in accord). [d. at 863-64, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 54-55. 
144. See id. at 864, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 55 (citing Shanks v. State, 185 Md. 437, 446-47, 
45 A.2d 85, 89 (1945» (comparing evidence that defendant had the same blood type as 
that found at the crime scene to evidence that a defendant was near the crime scene 
when the crime occurred). 
145. People Lindsey, 84 Cal. App. 3d at 866, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 56 (citing Common-
wealth v. Mussoline, 429 Pa. 464, 468, 240 A.2d 549, 551 (1968» (blood type evidence can 
only be used to corroborate other evidence at the time in question). 
146. See People v. Scott, 21 Cal. 3d 284, 296, 578 P.2d 123, 129, 145 Cal. Rptr. 876, 
882, (1978) (evidence of venereal infection trichomoniasis strongly suggests that victim 
had sexual relations with someone at some time). See also Lloyd, supra note 72, at 108 
(citing several authorities supporting proposition that presence of a sexually transmitted 
disease corroborates sexual activity). 
147. Lloyd, supra note 72, at 108. 
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admissible at a trial for the particular incident charged. us 
Evidence of the child's unusual or emotional behavior after 
an abusive episode can also corroborate the child's testimony.u9 
Such behavior may occur shortly after a moiestation,lllo or may 
occur as part of the "acting out" behavior that sexually abused 
children often exhibit, such as frequent masturbation and/or 
pseudo-seductive behavior. 1111 Psychological examinations may 
reveal disturbances, such as frequent and obvious sexual refer-
ences in a child's drawings. llI2 The person to whom the sexual 
abuse is reported will likely to be the best witness to a child's 
unusual behavior following a molestation. However, when inves-
tigating for such corroborative evidence the prosecution should 
not overlook parents, teachers, or siblings who have frequent op-
portunities to observe a child's behavior. 
There is a great need for medical or behavioral corrobora-
tive evidence in child sexual abuse prosecutions. This fact is evi-
denced by a California statute which requires that all convicted 
sex offenders give samples of their blood and saliva to the state 
government, evidence that can be used against them in future 
prosecutions.163 There are limits, however, as to how far the gov-
ernment can go to obtain medical evidence from an accused sex 
offender. 
148. Id. 
149. See, e.g., People v. Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d 561, 575, 199 Cal. Rptr. 796, 
803 (1984) (adults who witne88ed abnormal reactions and conduct of allegedly abU8ed 
children can share observations with jury); People v. Meacham, 152 Cal. App. 3d 142, 
156, 199 Cal. Rptr. 586, 595 (1984) (children's unusual behavior while attending nursery 
school highly probative of the intent with which defendant conducted private photogra-
phy sessions). 
150. See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 68 Cal. App. 3d 874, 879, 137 Cal. Rptr. 594, 596 
(1977) (teacher witnesses child crying on playground and climbing fence, acting 
hysterically). 
15l. Lloyd, supra note 72, at 109-10. See, e.g., People v. Meacham, 152 Cal. App. 3d 
142, 154-55, 199 Cal. Rptr. 586, 594 (parents testify to children's unusual behavior, in-
cluding masturbation, bedwetting, nightmares, sex play with other children, unruly be-
havior, and complaints of vaginal rashes). 
152. Lloyd, supra note 72, at 109 (citing Mele-Sernovitz, Parental Sexual Abuse of 
Children: The Law as a Therapeutic Tool for Families, in LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF 
THE MALTREATED CHILD 70, 78 (1979). 
153. Act of Sept. 9, 1983, ch. 700, § I, 1983 Cal. Stat. _ (codified at CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 290.2) (West supp. 1985). Under this statute, the withdrawal of blood must be 
performed in a "medically approved manner" and blood grouping analysis shall be re-
leased only to law enforcement agencies and district attorneys' offices. Id. at subd. (a)(b). 
30
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss3/1
1985] CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 467 
In People v. Scott,1r>4 the California Supreme Court held 
that the attempt to obtain medical evidence from a defendant 
violated his fourth amendment right against unreasonable 
searches. The particular facts of Scott were most compelling. In 
an effort to determine whether the defendant had the same ve-
nereal disease as a child molestation victim, m the accused was 
subjected to a prolonged massage of his prostate gland, necessa-
rily through his rectum, to induce involuntary ejaculation.1r>e Af-
ter articulating a balancing test to justify "bodily intrusions"UI7 
and finding that this intrusion violated both the California and 
the United States Constitutions, the court rejected the People's 
argument that the requirements for bodily intrusions be relaxed 
in sex cases because of the difficulty in obtaining corroborating 
evidence. "[I]t is precisely the general paucity of independent 
evidence which renders the criminal defendant in a sex case 
particularly vulnerable to questionable efforts at obtaining 
corroboration. "UI8 
2. Expert Testimony 
As is true in many areas of the law, the use of expert wit-
nesses is expanding in child sexual abuse prosecutions. The tes-
timony of those who are professionally familiar with the complex 
subject of child sexual abuse can potentially help educate juries 
on the intricacies of their specialty. us 
154. People v. Scott, 21 Cal. 3d 284, 295, 578 P.2d 123, 128, 145 Cal. Rptr. 876, 881 
(1978). While accepting appellant's fourth amendment arguments, the court rejected a 
fifth amendment self-incrimination argument and held that the privilege against self· 
incrimination is limited to the involuntary giving of testimonial or communicative evi· 
dence. [d. at 291, 578 P.2d at 126, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 879. 
155. The venereal disease was trichomoniasis. If a test on defendant's semen was 
conducted, there would be a 70% chance of showing whether or not defendant had this 
disease. The test proved negative, although it did reveal a chronic prostate infiamation, 
of which trichomoniasis was one of three possible causes. These results were introduced 
by the People at trial. [d. at 289, 578 P.2d at 125, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 878. 
156. [d. 
157. This test consists of balancing the severity of the imposed intrusion against 
such factors as the reliability of the method employed, the seriousness of the underlying 
criminal offense and society's consequent interest in obtaining a conviction, the strength 
of law enforcement suspicions that evidence of crime will be revealed, and the possibility 
that the evidence could have been obtained in a less burdensome manner. Scott, 21 Cal. 
3d at 293, 578 P.2d at 127, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 880. 
158. [d. at 295, 578 P.2d at 128-29, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 881. 
159. California courts frown upon "advocacy testimony" and any opinions given by 
"experts" that appear too absolute may be discounted by the judge. See, e.g., People v. 
Worthington, 38 Cal. App. 3d 359, 366, 113 Cal. Rptr. 322, 326 (1974) (affirming testi-
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To warrant the use of expert testimony as corroborating evi-
dence of an act of child sexual abuse, the prosecution must show 
that an expert is needed to draw inferences from the facts which 
a jury would not be competent to draw.16o If such "specialized 
knowledge"161 is required and an expert is shown to have suffi-
cient skill, knowledge, or experience in the pertinent field, the 
expert's testimony may be considered by the jury in its delibera-
tions.162 The trial judge has broad discretion to decide whether 
to permit expert testimony and reversals on appeal for an abuse 
of discretion are rare. 163 
Testimony from examining physicians is the most widely 
recognized use of expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases.164 
An examining physician can testify about any blood or sperm 
mony of doctor who was extremely cautious and guarded in expressing any opinions). 
160. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 1966). This statute provides: 
If a witness is testifying as an expert, his testimony in the 
form of an opinion is limited to such an opinion as is: 
(a) Related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common 
experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier 
of fact; and 
(b) Based on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, ex-
perience, training, and education) perceived by or personally 
known to the witness or made known to him at or before the 
hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that rea-
sonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opin-
ion upon the subject to which his testimony relates, unless an 
expert is precluded by law from using such matter as a basis 
for his opinion. 
[d. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 79, at § 13. 
161. This "specialized knowledge" of sexual abuse cases is admittedly in its early 
stages of development, but great progress has been made since California and other 
states began funding programs to attempt to deal with child sexual abuse. See supra 
notes 40, 65 & 66. 
162. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 720(a) (West 1966). Where an expert medical witness 
discloses sufficient knowledge of subject to entitle his opinion to go to jury, any question 
of the degree of his knowledge goes more towards the weight of the evidence than its 
admissibility. Evans v. Ohanesian, 39 Cal. App. 3d 121, 128, 112 Cal. Rptr. 236, 240 
(1974). 
163. Cooper v. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 49 Cal. App. 3d 931, 947, 123 Cal. Rptr. 
563, 573 (1975) (an abuse of discretion occurs only if the witness has disclosed sufficient 
knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to trier of fact); People v. Kelly, 17 
Cal. 3d 24, 39, 549 P.2d 1240, 1250, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 154 (1976) (trial court's ruling on 
qualification of expert will not be disturbed on appeal unless a manifest abuse of discre-
tion is shown). 
164. See, e.g., People v. Creighton, 57 Cal. App. 3d 314, 317, 129 Cal. Rptr. 249, 250 
(1976) (expert testified that the complainant did not engage in act of sexual intercourse 
on the date in question); People v. Belasco, 125 Cal. App. 3d 974, 979,178 Cal. Rptr. 461, 
463 (1981) (doctor testified that two abrasions indicated forced penile entry). 
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specimens found on the child's body or clothing, and can diag-
nose any bruising or swelling that may have been caused by sex-
ual activity.I611 If the alleged crime involves sexual intercourse, a 
doctor may offer his expert opinion on whether the child had 
engaged in recent acts of sexual intercourse.I66 While the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has commented that "[s]cientific evidence 
has for decades been a recognized if under-utilized resource for 
the proof of rape,"167 a more frequent problem than "under-util-
ization" in many child molestation prosecutions is the unav~ila­
bility of medical evidence either because no intercourse occurred 
or because of a significant delay between the sexual act(s) and 
the disclosure.I68 
The use of mental health professionals as expert witnesses 
in child sexual abuse cases is a growing practice both nationally 
and in California.I6s The expert's testimony is only one piece of 
evidence in a prosecution and does not establish a prima facie 
case of child sexual abuse. l7O A mental health professional can 
165. See, e.g., People v. Worthington, 38 Cal. App. 3d 359, 366, 113 Cal. Rptr. 322, 
326 (1974) (expert physician's diagnosis that swelling may have been caused by anal in-
tercourse was admissible). 
166. See supra note 164. 
167. People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 882, 538 P.2d 247, 259, 124 Cal. Rptr. 
119, 131 (1975). For proper procedures in gathering medical evidence in sex cases, see 
generally Enos, Beyer & Mann, The Medical Examination of Cases of Rape, in RAPE 
VICTIMOLOGY 221 (L. Schultz ed. 1975). 
168. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
169. J. BULKLEY, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LEGAL INTERVENTION IN IN-
TRAFAMILY CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 34 (1982). See, e.g., People v. Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. 
App. 3d 561, 577, 199 Cal. Rptr. 796, 804 (1984) (testimony by child sexual abuse expert 
that a sexually molested child finds it difficult to talk about sexual indiscretions with an 
adult). It should be noted that many of the "experts" in the field of child molestation are 
non-mental health professionals. The qualified experts in Dunnahoo were police officers 
who had extensive experience in dealing with child molestation victims. Id. 
170. Berliner, Blick & Bulkley, Expert Testimony on the Dynamics on Intra-Fam-
ily Sexual Abuse and Principles of Child Dellelopment, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE 
LAW 166, 169 (J. Bulkley ed. 1982). See, e.g., People v. Meacham, 152 Cal. App. 3d 142, 
148, 199 Cal. Rptr. 586, 590 (1984) (expert in child development testifies that nude poses 
by children on photographs were instigated by others, either physically or by demonstra-
tion). A prima facie case may be established by expert testimony where physical abuse is 
involved. See People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 507, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919, 921 (1971) 
(the "battered child syndrome" indicated that the child had not suffered his injury by 
accidental means). "This conclusion is based upon an extensive study of the subject by 
medical science. The additional finding that the injuries were probably occasioned by 
someone who is ostensibly caring for the child is simply a conclusion based upon logic 
and reason." Id. If enough "extensive study" is done on child sexual abuse cases, the 
possibility exists for development of a "child sexual abuse syndrome." See infra notes 
188-204 and accompanying text. 
33
Mertens: Child Sexual Abuse
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985
470 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:437 
help a jury understand why there was no physical injury to a 
child, why the child delayed in reporting the abuse, and why a 
child might retract a previous statement.l71 By so testifying, an 
expert can help rebut an inference that a child is fabricating a 
story. However, the expert witness cannot decide credibility is-
sues; these are for the jury to decide.172 
a. California Penal Code Section 1346 / Evidence 
Code Section 240(c) 
An increase in the use of child molestation mental health 
experts can be expected to follow from three recent legislative 
enactments. Through the first two enactments, the California 
Legislature has liberalized the evidence rules concerning the ad-
missibility of former testimony at trial.173 In 1983, the legislature 
enacted a law which authorizes the videotaping of certain child 
sexual abuse victims' testimony at the preliminary examina-
tion.m The videotape of the child's testimony would be admissi-
ble as evidence at trial under Evidence Code section 129p71i "[i]f 
at the time of trial the court finds that further testimony would 
cause the victim emotional trauma so that the victim is medi-
cally unavailable or otherwise unavailable within the meaning of 
Section 240 of the Evidence Code .... "176 
Subsequent to the passage of Penal Code section 1346, the 
legislature amended Evidence Code section 240 to state in perti-
nent part that 
171. Berliner, Blick & Bulkley, supra note 170, at 171-73. See also People v. Dun-
nahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d 561, 577, 199 Cal. Rptr. 796, 804 (1984) (expert testimony rele-
vant as to why child did not report abuse immediately). 
172. See, e.g., People v. Sergill. 138 Cal. App. 3d 34, 39, 187 Cal. Rptr. 497, 500 
(1982) (court found no authority to support the proposition that the veracity of those 
who report crimes to the police is a matter sufficiently beyond common experience to 
require testimony of an expert). 
173. General rules governing the admission of past testimony are codified in Califor-
nia under CAL. EVID. CODE § 1291 (West 1966). These rules are: (1) the witness must be 
"unavailable", and (2) either the former testimony is offered against the person who of-
fered it earlier or it is offered by the same party that offered it earlier, provided that the 
opposing party had the opportunity and motive to cross-examine the witness. [d. at 
Bubd.(a)(1)(2). 
174. Act of March 6, 1982, ch. 98, § 1, 1982 Cal. Stat. 313 (codified at CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1985). The child witness must be fifteen years of age or 
younger to qualify for videotaping under this statute. [d. at subd. (a). 
175. See supra note 173. 
176. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346(d) (West Supp. 1985). 
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[e]xpert testimony which establishes that physical 
or mental trauma resulting from an alleged crime 
has caused harm to a witness of sufficient severity 
that the witness is physically unable to testify or 
is unable to testify without suffering substantial 
trauma may constitute a sufficient showing of un-
availability pursuant to paragraph (3) of subdivi-
sion (a). I?? 
471 
The "expert" who finds the witness "unavailable" may be a phy-
sician, psychiatrist, psychologist, licensed clinical social worker, 
or a marriage, family, or child counselor.178 
Because the mental trauma experienced by a child while 
testifying to acts of sexual abuse are potentially significant,179 
any child who experiences such trauma at the preliminary hear-
ing may be spared going through the trauma a second time,180 
assuming that the defendant had the opportunity to cross-ex-
amine the witness at the preliminary examination.181 While min-
imizing the trauma of court appearances on sexual abuse victims 
should be a priority of the legislature, there are several ways of 
doing this that are less prejudicial to the defendant,182 who pos-
177. Act of July 11, 1984, ch. 401, § 1, 1984 Cal. Stat. __ (codified at CAL. EVID. 
CODE § 240(c) (West Supp. 1985)). 
178. [d. See also CAL. EVID. CODE.§ 1010 (b)(c)(e) (West Supp. 1985) for statutory 
definitions of psychologist, licensed clinical social worker, and marriage, family and child 
counselor. 
179. This especially true if the witness accuses a parent or close relative of the mo-
lestation. See supra note 31. 
180. This assumes that the trial judge exercises his discretion and finds the witness 
"unavailable" under CAL. EVID. CODE § 240(c) (West Supp. 1985). 
181. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1291(a)(2) (West Supp. 1985). 
182. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 28, 1978, ch. 1310, § 1, 1978 Cal. Stat. 4298 (codified at 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 868.5) (West Supp. 1985), which entitles a sex offense prosecuting 
witness under seventeen years of age to the presence of a support person (parent, sibling, 
relative, or friend) at the preliminary hearing and trial. The closing of the preliminary 
examination to the public is also statutorily authorized in California. See infra notes 
185-87 and accompanying text. Hopefully the increased state support for programs con-
cerning child sexual abuse victims will help to sensitize the criminal justice system to the 
needs of such victims and better equip them to face the accused in open court. See supra 
notes 39-43 and accompanying text. A bill recently proposed in the California Legisla-
ture would provide for the following as means to help consider the special needs of child 
witnesses who are ten years of age or under: 
(a) Forego the wearing of judicial robes. 
(b) Relocate the placement of the judge, parties, witnesses, 
support persons, or court personnel to facilitate a more com-
fortable and personal environment for a child witness who is 
ten years of age or under. 
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sesses a constitutional right to confront those who accuse him.183 
Since the testimony of the complaining witness is so vital in sex 
offense cases, it must be questioned whether a preliminary hear-
(c) Order more frequent recesses to accommodate the special 
physical, mental, and emotional needs of a child witness who 
is ten years of age or under. 
(d) Appoint a volunteer to advise the court during the testi-
mony of a child witness who is ten years of age or under, as to 
the special physical, mental, and emotional needs of the child 
witness. 
(e) Allow a support person to have physical contact with a 
child witness who is ten years of age or under. 
Cal. A.B. 295, at 3 (1985-86). 
183. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 
686(3) (West Supp. 1985). The California Legislature recently passed a bill which raises 
several confrontation issues. Cal. S.B. 46 (1985-86) (codified at PENAL CODE § 1347). This 
bill permits a court to order that the testimony of a child sexual abuse victim ten years 
or younger be taken by contemporaneous examination (and cross-examination) in an-
other place, out of the presence of the judge, jury, defendant and attorneys. Cal. S.B. 46, 
at 3 (1985-86). The child's testimony will be communicated to the court room by means 
of two way closed-circuit television. Id. This method of testifying can only be used if it is 
shown by clear and convincing evidence that the child is "unavailable" as a witness for 
one or more of the following reasons: 1) the child or a family member was threatened 
with serious bodily injury or the child was removed from the family in order to prevent 
or dissuade the minor from reporting the alleged sexual abuse, 2) a deadly weapon was 
used in the commission of the charged offense, 3) great bodily injury was inflicted upon 
the child during the commission of the crime, or 4) the conduct of defense counselor the 
defendant during the hearing causes the minor to be unable to continue testifying. Id. at 
3-4. 
Under this enactment, the defendant's right to confront the witnesses who accuse 
him will be affected in several ways. First, physical confrontation will not be possible 
under the above arrangement. See Herbert v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 667, 
172 Cal. Rptr. 850, 852 (1981), which appears upon close reading to include physical 
confrontation as an element of sixth amendment guarantees. Second, the defense attor-
ney's cross-examination may be hampered because of the use of the two-way television 
system. Moreover, "there are serious questions about the effects on the jury of using 
closed-circuit television to present the testimony of an absent witness since the camera 
becomes the juror's eyes, selecting and commenting upon what is seen." Hochheiser v. 
Superior, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 786, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 278 (1984). For example, "the 
lens or camera angle chosen can make a witness look small and weak or large and 
strong." Note, The Criminal Videotape Trial: Serious Constitutional Questions, 55 OR. 
L. REV. 567, 575 (1976). Closed circuit television may also "affect the presumption of 
innocence by creating prejudice in the minds of the jurors towards the defendant similar 
to that created by the use of physical restraints on a defendant in the jury's presence." 
Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 787, 298 Cal. Rptr. at 279. Finally, the jury may have 
difficulty in assessing the victim's credibility via closed-circuit television. The demeanor 
of the witness is one of the factors that a juror may consider in assessing credibility (see 
CAL. EVID. CODE § 780(a) (West 1966)), and the ability of the jury to assess demeanor 
may be impinged upon through the use of closed circuit television. It may be preferable 
for the legislature to concentrate on finding ways to help a child confront the accused 
(see supra note 182), rather than passing drastic measures which raise constitutional 
questions. 
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ing cross-examination184 adequately ensures a defendant of his 
right to confront those who testify against him. 
b. California Penal Code Section 868.7 
A second legislative enactment that portends a greater role 
for expert witnesses in child sexual abuse prosecutions involves 
closing the courtroom while a complaining witness testifies dur-
ing a preliminary hearing. m Before a courtroom may be closed, 
the prosecution must show that testifying before the general 
public "would be likely to cause serious psychological harm to 
the witness."186 Although no appellate case has yet defined "seri-
ous psychological harm," it would appear that objective expert 
testimony could substantially support a victim's subjective claim 
that he or she does not wish to testify in public.187 
c. Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome 
A final area where expert testimony can potentially aid a 
jury is still in its developmental stages. The phrase "child sexual 
abuse syndrome" has been coined to describe this area.188 To es-
tablish a prima facie case of sexual abuse using evidence of this 
184. Preliminary hearings in California must be conducted within 10 days of defen-
dant's arraignment. CAL. PENAL CODE § 859b (West Supp. 1985). While a continuance 
can be granted, it would still be difficult to conduct a complete and adequate croS8-
examination at the preliminary hearing, especially since defense counsel is often forced 
to "discover" the People's case at the preliminary hearing. 
185. Act of March 1, 1982, ch. 83, § 4, 1982 Cal. Stat. 245 (codified at CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 868.7 (West Supp. 1985). 
186. CAL. PENAL CODE § 868.7(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985). For a judge to approve clos-
ing a courtroom, there must not be any alternative procedures available that would spare 
the victim the trauma of testifying in public. Procedures specifically mentioned are the 
videotaping of a child's deposition and the contemporaneous examination in another 
place communicated to the courtroom via closed-circuit television. [d. 
187. This situation is clearly analogous to the above discussion concerning expert 
testimony and the "unavailability" of the witness. See supra notes 176-80 and accompa-
nying text. Constitutional questions concerning the right of the press to have acceS8 to 
criminal trials and the right of the defendant to a public trial are raised whenever a 
courtroom is closed to the public. However, the United States Supreme Court has stated 
that the "compelling state interest" in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-
being of the minor is sufficient to justify closing a courtroom if the particular facts of the 
case justify such action. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-
08 (1982), where the Court held that a Massachusetts closure law was unconstitutional 
because it forbade the press from being present during the testimony of all minor vic-
tims of sex offenses, regardless of the facts in a given case. [d. at 607-08. 
188. Lloyd, supra note 72, at 109-10 (citing Mele-Sernovitz, Parental Sexual Abuse 
of Children: The Law as a Therapeutic Tool for Families, in LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF 
THE MALTREATED CHILD 70, 80-81 (1979». 
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syndrome, medical testimony or a statement of abuse by the 
child which constitutes an "excited utterance"189 is combined 
with other circumstantial evidence such as behavioral indicators 
and family dynamics. 190 
Study of this syndrome is in its developmental stages and 
thus likely to be inadmissible at a criminal trial. 191 However, the 
groundwork for admitting evidence of the syndrome is being laid 
in parallel areas of the law. California courts have recognized the 
"battered child syndrome" by permitting (in criminal cases) ex-
pert medical opinion that a child has been battered.192 Although 
this medical diagnosis is based on probability, this lack of scien-
tific certainty does not deprive the medical opinion of its eviden-
tiary value.198 However, the expert witness can only testify as to 
whether or not the child was battered and cannot venture an 
opinion on whether the defendant inflicted the injuries.194 
In another related area, the California Supreme Court re-
cently approved of the admissibility of evidence concerning 
"rape trauma syndrome."l911 The court distinguished past cases 
that had seemingly sounded the death knell for such evidence,196 
189. See infra notes 214-20 and accompanying text. 
190. "Behavioral indicators" of the sexually abused child may include clinical de-
pression, runaway or truant tendencies, involvement with drugs, pseudo-mature seduc-
tive behavior, and promiscuity. See Berliner, Blick & Bulkley, supra note 170, at 172-73. 
"Family dynamics" of the sexual abuse case may include a child who endures the abuse 
for several years, a passive parent who unconsciously denies that the abuse has occurred, 
and a child who makes inconsistent statements concerning the sexual abuse. Id. at 171-
72. 
191. J. BULKLEY, supra note 169, at 41. Because the study of "child sexual abuse 
syndrome" is in the developmental stages, it is not study "of a type that reasonably may 
be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testi-
mony relates .... " CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(b) (West Supp. 1985). 
192. People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 508, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919, 922 (1971) (in 
prosecution for child beating, admission into evidence of a doctor's diagnosis of a "bat-
tered child syndrome" was not an improper invasion of the province of the jury). Accord 
People v. Phillips, 122 Cal. App. 3d 69, 87,175 Cal. Rptr. 703, 714 (1981) (the intentional 
poisoning of a child, being merely another form of child abuse, warranted the admission 
of expert testimony under Jackson). 
193. People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 507, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919, 921 (1971). 
194. Id. The Jackson court went on to state that the doctor's conclusions as to what 
caused the abuse were based upon extensive study of the subject by medical science. 
"The additional finding that the injuries were probably occasioned by someone who is 
ostensibly caring for the child is simply a conclusion based upon reason and logic." Id. 
195. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 247-48, 681 P.2d 291, 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 
457 (1984). 
196. See, e.g., People v. Guthreau, 102 Cal. App. 3d 436, 162 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1980); 
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stating that "there is nothing in those decisions to suggest that 
all expert testimony by rape counselors is inadmissible. "lS7 The 
court approved of the evidentiary value of the syndrome in help-
ing to rebut false inferences which a jury may draw because of a 
victim's inconsistent statements, delay in reporting the rape, or 
unusual behavior following the rape. lS8 However, the court re-
jected admission of "rape syndrome" evidence to prove that a 
rape had, in fact, occurred, reasoning that the general scientific 
community had not developed the syndrome for that purpose. ISS 
The court was careful to point out that the "rape syndrome" was 
distinguishable from the "battered child syndrome," which was 
developed for the express purpose of helping society to discover 
which of its youth are being physically abused.20o In this regard 
the "child sexual abuse syndrome" may be closer to the "bat-
tered child syndrome" than to the "rape trauma syndrome," as-
suming that child sexual abuse experts use evidence of the syn-
drome to help discover which children are being sexually abused, 
and not develop it solely for therapeutic reasons. 
Outside of the criminal law, one California court approved 
of testimony concerning child sexual abuse syndrome as it ap-
plied to civil dependency hearings.20l After noting that expert 
People v. Clark, 109 Cal. App. 3d 88, 167 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1980). Bledsoe distinguished 
both of these cases: 
In both of these cases, the expert witnesses-rape counselors 
employed by police departments-testified that under the cir-
cumstances in which the alleged victim found herself, the de-
gree of resistance displayed by the victim was entirely reason-
able .... [However) [e) vidence that an expert was of the 
opinion the prosecutrix's resistance was reasonable under the 
circumstances is irrelevant to the issue of [the defendant's) 
bona fide belief. [Citation) 
Id. at 246, 681 P.2d at 297, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 456 (emphasis in original). 
197. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 246, 681 P.2d 291, 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 
457 (1984). 
198. Id. at 247-48, 681 P.2d at 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457. 
199. Id. at 248-51, 681 P.2d at 299-301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 458-60. The scientific com-
munity developed the rape trauma syndrome "as a therapeutic tool, to help identify, 
predict and treat emotional problems experienced by the counselors' clients or patients 
.... [R)ape counselors are taught to make a conscious effort to avoid judging the credi-
bility of their clients." Id. at 249-50, 681 P.2d at 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459. 
200. Id. at 249-50, 681 P.2d at 299-301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 458-60. "Unlike finger-
prints, blood tests, lie detectors, voice prints or the battered child syndrome, rape 
trauma syndrome was not devised to determine the 'truth' or 'accuracy' of a particular 
past event .... " Id. at 249, 681 P.2d at 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459. 
201. In re Cheryl H. v. L.A. County Dep't of Public Social Services, 153 Cal. App. 
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testimony was admissible in child beating cases, the court 
stated: 
[H]ere, of course, it is not medical testimony 
about the physical characteristics of the injury 
which supports the diagnosis. Rather it is psychi-
atric testimony about the victim's post-injury be-
havior which leads to the conclusion she was sex-
ually abused. But that behavior appears to be 
unique to children subjected to child abuse and as 
valid indicia of such abuse as the physical charac-
teristics used to diagnose "battered child 
syndrome. "202 
The court also held, however, that the expert's opinion that the 
father was the sexual abuser was inadmissible.203 
Expert testimony on child sexual abuse syndrome is poten-
tially a valuable and legitimate part of a sexual abuse prosecu-
tion, but further study in this area needs to be done. State legis-
latures can facilitate this study by increasing the funding for 
child sexual abuse research. Through such funding, the legal sys-
tem's involvement in these cases could concentrate "less on a 
frantic search for admissible evidence, and more on obtaining 
protection of the child and treatment for the child and 
family."204 
3. Hearsay Evidence 
Hearsay evidence is testimony in court of a statement made 
out of court, offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.206 
Although hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible at trial,206 
numerous exceptions to this hearsay rule have developed over 
3d 1098, 1116-18, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789, 800-01 (1984). 
202. [d. at 1117, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 800-01. 
203. [d. at 1121, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 803. The court held that the expert did what the 
expert in Jackson did not do: express an opinion that a certain individual committed the 
acts of abuse. [d. 
204. J. Bulkley, supra note 169, at 41. 
205. CAL EVID. CODE § 1200(b) (West 1966). See also MCCORMICK, supra note 79, at 
§ 246. 
206. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200(b) (West 1966). See also MCCORMICK, supra note 79, at 
§ 245. The rule against hearsay is designed to ensure compliance with three ideal condi-
tions under which witnesses ordinarily will be required to testify: oath, personal presence 
at trial, and cross-examination. [d. 
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the years. 207 Commentators posit two main reasons for the 
proliferation of hearsay exceptions: first, the reliability and 
trustworthiness of certain out of court statements justifies their 
admission into evidence208 and, secondly, there is a high neces-
sity in certain cases for such hearsay evidence.209 
These two factors of "reliability" and "necessity" are often 
present when a child sexual abuse victim makes the out of court 
statement. On the "reliability" side, the courts seem to believe 
that a child's statement of sexual abuse is very trustworthy, 
pointing out on occasion that children are not adept at reasoned 
reflection or at concocting false stories under such circum-
stances.210 On the "necessity" side, a scarcity of evidence in child 
sexual abuse prosecutions is inherent in the crime.2l1 Hence, it is 
not surprising that child molestation prosecutors have increas-
ingly relied upon exceptions to the hearsay rule to either (1) cor-
roborate the child's testimony,212 or (2) help establish the corpus 
delicti of the crime.213 
The hearsay exception most often utilized In sexual abuse 
207. California has some fifty specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. See CAL. EVID. 
CODE § 1220-1340 (West 1966). 
208. MCCORMICK, supra note 79, at § 253. The availability or unavailability of the 
witness is not controlling for hearsay statements grounded in the belief that there is good 
"reliability" and "trustworthiness." [d. See also 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §§ 1420-1422, at 
252-54 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). 
209. This occurs most often when a witness is unavailable for trial. While live testi-
mony is preferred, if the declarant is unavailable, the out of court statement will be 
accepted. MCCORMICK, supra note 79, at § 253. See also 5 WIGMORE, supra note 208, 
§ 1420, at 253. 
210. J. BULKLEY, supra note 169, at 35. See also supra notes 98-100 and accompany-
ing text. 
211. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. Furthermore, a child may be too 
young to qualify as a competent witness, hence, he or she is "unavailable" for trial and 
an exception to the hearsay rule is needed. See, e.g., People v. Orduno, 80 Cal. App. 3d 
738, 742, 145 Cal. Rptr. 806, 808 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1978) (hearsay 
statement of child too young to testify admissible under exception to hearsay rule). 
212. This is usually done through admission of a child sexual abuse victim's "com-
plaint of rape." See, e.g., People v. Crume, 61 Cal. App. 3d 803, 813-14, 132 Cal. Rptr. 
577,583 (1976) (evidence of complaint by victim of sex offense corroborates child's testi-
mony). See infra notes 221-24 and accompanying text. 
213. This often occurs when a child does not testify at trial, but made a "spontane-
ous declaration" shortly after the molestation. See, e.g., People v. Butler, 249 Cal. App. 
2d 799, 806-07, 57 Cal. Rptr. 798, 803 (1967) (child witness' "spontaneous declaration" 
admissible as exception to hearsay rule, therefore admissible to prove truth of matter 
asserted). See infra notes 214-20 and accompanying text. 
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cases is the "spontaneous statement" exception.214 To render a 
child's statement admissible under this exception, three require~ 
ments must be met: (1) there must be some occurrence startling 
enough to produce nervous excitement and the corresponding 
unreflective statements, (2) the nervous excitement must still be 
present when the statements are made, and (3) the statement 
must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence preceding 
it.21Ci If these three requirements are met to the judge's satisfac~ 
tion,216 the evidence is admissible as tending to prove the truth 
of the matter stated. Furthermore, California courts have con~ 
sistently held that admitting a spontaneous declaration into evi~ 
dence does not violate the defendant's constitutional right to 
confront witnesses.217 
Despite the great need for a sexual abuse victim's out of 
court statements and the apparently broad discretion given to 
the trial judges' interpretation of the three requirements, Cali~ 
fornia courts have generally construed the "contemporaneous 
time factor" narrowly.u6 This has led to the inadmissibility of 
most statements not made immediately after a sexual abuse in~ 
cident. In contrast, other jurisdictions have developed a specific 
"tender years" offshoot of the spontaneous statement excep-
tion.u9 This "tender years" doctrine has considerably length-
214. J. BULKLEY, supra note 169, at 34. See, e.g., People v. Butler, 249 Cal. App. 2d 
799, 804-06, 57 Cal. Rptr. 798, 802-03 (1967) (spontaneous statements from two children 
after abusive episode admissible at trial); People v. Orduno, 80 Cal. App. 3d 738, 742, 145 
Cal. Rptr. 806, 808 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1978) (child's statement that "the 
man wet my pants" admissible as spontaneous declaration). Of course, an adult's sponta-
neous declarations are also admissible at trial. See, e.g., People v. Worthington, 38 Cal. 
App. 3d 359, 366, 113 Cal. Rptr. 322, 326 (1974) (mother's spontaneous statement that 
"he's trying to go down on my daughter" admissible at trial). 
215. People v. Orduno, 80 Cal. App. 3d 738, 746, 145 Cal. Rptr. 806, 810 (1978), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1978). See also MCCORMICK, supra note 79, at § 297. 
216. See People v. Ferguson, 99 Cal. App. 3d 356, 365, 160 Cal. Rptr. 263, 268 (1979) 
(application of spontaneous declaration exception is confided to the sound discretion of 
the trial judge). 
217. People v. Orduno, 80 Cal. App. 3d 738, 748, 145 Cal. Rptr. 806, 811-12 (1978), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1978) (citing abundant authority in other jurisdictions that 
have held that admission of spontaneous declarations did not violate the confrontation 
clause). See also In re Damon H., 165 Cal. App. 3d 471, 479, 211 Cal. Rptr. 623, 628 
(1985) (admission of hearsay evidence comports with the substance of the right to con-
front witnesses). 
218. See, e.g., In re Cheryl H. v. L.A. County Dep't of Public Social Services, 153 
Cal. App. 3d 1098, 1130, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789, 810 (1984) (nothing in case law suggested 
that the necessary level of psychological stress could be sustained for even a few hours). 
219. See, e.g., State v. Duncan, 53 Ohio St. 2d 215, 222, 373 N.E.2d 1234, 1238 
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ened the legally allowable time lapse between a molestation and 
the statement being offered under the exception,220 ostensibly on 
the belief that statements of a child abuse victim are reliable 
despite the fact that the victim had time to reflect after the 
incident. 
In California, when a child does not report a molestation 
immediately, his or her extrajudicial statements may still be ad-
missible under the court created "complaint of rape" exception 
to the hearsay rule. 221 Under this exception, evidence that a vic-
tim made a "fresh complaint" after a molestation is admissible 
to rebut an inference of fabrication.222 Even if a complaint is not 
made immediately after the abusive episode, this fact only af-
fects the weight of the evidence.223 While the time limit require-
ments are less restrictive under the complaint of rape theory 
than the spontaneous statement theory, the former is restricted 
in scope to include only the reporting of the crime itself. No de-
tails of the molestation are admissible.224 Hence, the spontane-
ous statement exception is preferable to the complaint of rape 
exception if the prosecution is attempting to establish the 
corpus delicti of the crime. 
(1978) (two hour time period elapsed between abusive incident and child's reporting); 
State v. McFall, 75 S.D. 630, 634-35, 71 N.W.2d 299, 301-02 (1955) (six-year-old related 
details of molestation two weeks after incidents occurred). 
220. One case in Michigan upheld a three month time period between a molestation 
and the subsequent statements of the victim. People v. Gage, 62 Mich. 271, 275, 28 N.W. 
835,836 (1886). However, in 1982, the Michigan Supreme Court eliminated this "tender 
years" exception in Michigan through its interpretation of the modern Michigan Code of 
Evidence. See People v. Kreiner, 415 Mich. 372, 377-78, 329 N.W.2d 716, 719-20 (1982). 
221. See, e.g., People v. Meacham, 152 Cal. App. 3d 142, 159, 199 Cal. Rptr. 586, 597 
(1984); People v. Orduno, 80 Cal. App. 3d 738, 745, 145 Cal. Rptr. 806, 810 (1978), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1978). In Meacham, the court held that a recent complaint by a 
minor victim was admissible as non-hearsay evidence because it was admitted to show a 
complaint was made not to show the truth of the statement made. Id. at 158, 199 Cal. 
Rptr. at 596. 
222. People v. Burton, 55 Cal. 2d 328, 351, 359 P.2d 433, 443-44, 11 Cal. Rptr. 65, 
75-76 (1961) (seven-year-old told mother that defendant twice "made me play with his 
peter"). Id. at 337, 359 P.2d at 435, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 67. See also People v. Brown, 35 Cal. 
App. 3d 317, 323-24, 110 Cal. Rptr. 854, 858 (1973) (fifteen-year-old told officer that 
defendant committed an act of sodomy upon her body). 
223. People v. Meacham, 152 Cal. App. 3d 142, 158-59, 199 Cal. Rptr. 586, 597 
(1984) (possible one month period between the molestation and complaints sufficiently 
"fresh" to be admissible). 
224. Id. (citing People v. Burton, 55 Cal. 2d 328, 351-52, 359 P.2d 433, 444, 11 Cal. 
Rptr. 65, 76 (1961)) (although details of the incident were not admissible, the victim's 
statement of the nature of the offense and the identity of the alleged offender were 
admissible). 
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Although the excited utterance and complaint of rape ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule are the most commonly used excep-
tions in sexual abuse cases, other exceptions may also apply. 
The "bodily feelings" exception221i arises occasionally, most often 
when the victim describes a molestation to an attending physi-
cian.226 The physician uses the child's statements in making his 
diagnosis and may testify to their content. This exception gener-
ally excludes the description of past pain or symptoms,227 al-
though they may be admissible if a physician considers them in 
making his diagnosis. Furthermore, the proposed testimony can-
not include the identity of the person who caused the condition 
or bodily feelings because such information is not necessary to 
the diagnosis. 228 
In conjunction with the hearsay testimony of the examining 
physician, hospital or medical records in sexual molestation 
cases provide corroborating evidence under the "regularly kept 
records" exception to the hearsay rule.229 The importance of care 
225. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1250 (West 1966) states in pertinent part: 
(a) [EJvidence of a statement of the declarant's then existing 
state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation (including a 
statement of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, 
or bodily health) is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule 
when: 
(1) The evidence is offered to prove the declarant's state of 
mind, emotion, or physical sensation at that time or at any 
other time when it is itself an issue in the action; or 
(2) The evidence is offered to prove or explain acts or conduct 
of the declarant. 
(b) This section does not make admissible evidence of a state-
ment of memory of belief . . . . 
Id. See also MCCORMICK, supra note 79, at § 291 (statements of the declarant's present 
bodily condition and symptoms, including pain and other feelings, are generally admissi-
ble to prove the truth of the matter asserted). 
226. See MCCORMICK, supra note 79, at §§ 292-93. 
227. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1250(b) (West 1966). See also MCCORMICK, supra note 79, at 
§ 291. See, e.g., Benwell v. Dean, 249 Cal. App. 2d 345, 350, 57 Cal. Rptr. 394, 399 (1967). 
228. See In re Cheryl H. v. L.A. County Dep't of Public Social Services, 153 Cal. 
App. 3d 1098, 1119, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789, 802 (1984) (California's "state of mind" exception 
excluded statements about declarant's state of mind as evidence of a third person's con-
duct). See also CAL. EVID. CODE § 1250(b) (West 1966). 
229. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1270-1272 (West 1966). Section 1270 defines a "business;" 
section 1271 states what is necessary for evidence of a writing made as a record to be 
admitted into evidence: 
(a) The writing was made in the regular course of business; 
(b) The writing was made at or near the time of the act, condi-
tion or event; 
(c) The custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its 
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and precision in compiling these records should be obvious from 
the frequency such testimony is offered by both the prosecution 
and the defense. 23o Unfortunately, "[m]edical records haven't al-
ways been taken properly. The symptoms of trauma have not 
been indicated, and if evidence is not gathered quickly and com-
pletely, prosecution is difficult. "231 As is true with declarations of 
present bodily feelings, the hospital records must relate to diag-
nosis and treatment if they are to be used for corroborating 
purposes. 
In addition to the well established exceptions to the hearsay 
rule, some states have created a new hearsay exception that spe-
cifically addresses out of court statements by child sexual abuse 
victims. 232 While these statutes vary in some regards, such as the 
age of the qualifying child, all require the trial judge to find 
"sufficient indicia of reliability" involving the circumstances sur-
rounding the statement.233 This trustworthiness examination is 
conducted outside the presence of the jury. These statutes also 
provide that if a child does not testify at the hearing, there must 
be some corroborative evidence that the act in question actually 
occurred.234 Adequate notice to the defendant is also required by 
the statute.2311 
identity and the mode of its preparation; and 
(d) The sources of information and method and time of prepa· 
ration were such as to indicate its trustworthiness. 
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1271 (West 1966). See also Springer v. Reimers, 4 Cal. App. 3d 325, 
338, 84 Cal. Rptr. 486, 493 (1970) (properly authenticated hospital records were admissi-
ble in so far as they recorded personal observations of attending physician or pertinent 
statements of patient's history which physician had made use of in reaching his profes-
sional opinions). 
230. Burgess & Laszlo, Courtroom Use of Hospital Records in Sexual Assault 
Cases, in THE SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 257 (L. Schultz ed. 1980). 
231. [d. at 258. 
232. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (West Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 
13-25-129 (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-5-411 (Supp. 1983). 
233. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120(1) (West Supp. 1985). The court 
must find that "the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient 
indicia of reliability .... " [d. 
234. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129(b)(I)(II) (Supp. 1984). If sufficient relia-
bility permits evidence to be heard by the jury, the child must either testify at the hear-
ing or be "unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act which is 
the subject of the statement." [d. 
235. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411(2) (Supp. 1983): "A statement may be 
admitted under this exception only if the proponent of it makes known to the adverse 
party with an opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention in offering the statement, 
and the particulars of it." [d. 
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The California Legislature has rejected passing a similar 
statute236 because of the constitutional problems that such a 
statute could present.237 However, the federal constitution ap-
pears to pose no obstacles to a carefully worded hearsay excep-
tion. In fact, it has been argued that the child sexual abuse hear-
say exceptions written to date go further in protecting a 
defendant's right to confrontation than has the United States 
Supreme Court.238 
The legislature has passed a more limited hearsay exception 
that provides for admitting a child's out of court statement only 
when a defendant has made a confession.239 While this limited 
exception will be quite helpful to those prosecutions where it ap-
plies,240 there are obviously many reliable statements that will 
be inadmissible because the defendant has not made a confes-
sion or the statement does not qualify under one of the other 
hearsay exceptions. 
In sum, an exception to the hearsay rule for out of court 
statements made by child sexual abuse victims is justified when 
a trial court is convinced that the circumstances surrounding the 
statement indicate that it is reliable and trustworthy. This ex-
ception can be specifically tailored to sexual abuse cases or can 
be written along the lines of the various "residual exceptions" 
that have been enacted in other states and under the Federal 
236. Cal. S.B. 621 (1983-84). 
237. See Note, The Sexually Abused Infant Hearsay Exception: A Constitutional 
Analysis, 8 J. Juv. L. 59, 61 (1984). This author argues that sexually abused child excep-
tions do pass constitutional muster. Id. at 68-73. 
238. See Comment, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in 
Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1745, 1766 (1983). 
239. Act of Sept. 25, 1984, ch. 1421, § I, 1984 Cal. Stat. _ (codified at CAL. EVID. 
CODE § 1228) (West Supp. 1985), providing for the admission of out-of-court statements 
concerning sexual abuse if (1) the child is under the age of 12, (2) the statement was 
included in a law enforcement or county welfare department report, (3) the statement 
was made prior to the defendant's confession, (4) circumstances indicate the reliability of 
the statements, (5) the minor child is found to be unavailable or refuses to testify, and 
(6) notice is give to the defendant. Id. (emphasis added) Furthermore, if the statement is 
found admissible it can only be used to corroborate the defendant's confession. Id. It 
appears that this statute does not require a literal finding of "unavailability"-the 
child's refusal to testify apparently is sufficient to invoke this statute. 
240. Before a defendant's confession will be found admissible at trial in California, 
there must be some independent corroboration that the act charged occurred. People v. 
Ramirez, 91 Cal. App. 3d 132, 137, 153 Cal. Rptr. 789, 791 (1979) (the corpus delicti of a 
crime must be established independently of extrajudicial statements of defendant). 
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Rules of Evidence.241 The need for a hearsay exception is great, 
especially when a child is found incompetent to testify. The 
most helpless victim of sexual abuse-those under five years of 
age-should have some means to accuse their molester in court; 
a hearsay exception could provide that means. A carefully 
worded statute can adequately provide for a defendant's right to 
confront his accuser.242 
The prosecution, however, should not rely too heavily on 
hearsay statements from child witnesses when preparing sexual 
abuse cases for trial. A live witness is not only potentially more 
credible, but the hearsay statement is still only' admissible as 
corroboration of the testimony. Thus, we must give priority to 
finding ways that adapt the courtroom process to the realities of 
a child's existence so that more children can testify credibly in 
court. Such oral testimony can potentially aid not only the pros-
ecution, but also the defendant, who would have the opportunity 
to cross-examine his accuser. 
4. Prior Sexual Acts 
It is common in child molestation prosecutions to attempt 
to introduce evidence of a defendant's prior sexual acts. The 
main impetus behind these efforts is, once again, the lack of evi-
dence available in many sexual abuse cases. This raises to new 
heights (1) efforts to find admissible corroborative evidence, and 
(2) efforts to cast shadows on the credibility of both the com-
plainant and defendant. While testimony concerning prior sex-
ual acts by a defendant is potentially admissible in California as 
either corroborative evidence or credibility evidence,243 courts in 
recent years have begun to limit the admissibility of such preju-
dicial evidence. 
The California Evidence Code codifies the general rule in 
241. See FED. R. EVID. 803(24); WIS. R. EVID. § 908.03(24) (1975). The Federal Rules 
permit the admission of hearsay evidence that does not fit under one of the regular ex-
ceptions if such statement (1) has circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, (2) is 
offered as evidence of a material fact, (3) is not cumulative, and (4) should be admissible 
"in the interest of justice." FED. R. EVID. 803(24). 
242. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text. 
243. See People v. Thomas, 20 Cal. 3d 457, 468, 573 P.2d 433, 439, 143 Cal. Rptr. 
215, 221 (1978) (if evidence of similar, non-remote offenses were independently admissi-
ble as showing a common plan or scheme, then such evidence would also be admissible to 
support the witness' version of facts). 
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California that "evidence of a person's character or a trait of his 
character . . . is inadmissible when offered to prove his conduct 
on a specified occasion."244 The purposes of this exclusionary 
rule are threefold: 
(1) to avoid placing the accused in a position in 
which he must defend against uncharged offenses, 
(2) to guard against the probability that evidence 
of such uncharged acts would prejudice defendant 
in the minds of the jurors, and 
(3) to promote judicial efficiency by restricting 
proof of extraneous crimes.24 & 
In short, a defendant should not be convicted because the prose-
cution can prove that he is a bad person.246 Hence, evidence of 
past sexual acts by a defendant is inadmissible if offered solely 
to prove a defendant's criminal disposition.247 
However, evidence made inadmissible by Evidence Code 
section 1101(a) is potentially admissible under section 1101(b). 
This latter section provides that evidence of past wrongs may be 
admissible "when relevant to prove some fact. . . other than his 
disposition to commit such acts."248 Specifically mentioned as 
admissible are facts that indicate a motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident on the part of the defendant.249 The prosecution in 
child molestations and other sex crimes is often successful in ad-
mitting evidence that appears at first blush to be inadmissible as 
material to prove one of the above factors.2110 
244. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(a) (West 1966). 
245. People v. Thomas, 20 Cal. 3d 457, 464, 573 P.2d 433, 436, 143 Cal. Rptr. 215, 
218 (1978); People v. Cramer, 67 Cal. 2d 126, 129, 429 P.2d 582, 585, 60 Cal. Rptr. 230, 
233 (1967). See also MCCORMICK, supra note 79, at 188 (character evidence "laden with 
the dangerous baggage of prejudice, distraction, time consumption, and surprise"). 
246. People v. Adamson, 225 Cal. App. 2d 74, 79, 36 Cal. Rptr. 894, 898 (1964). See 
also 1 WIGMORE. EVIDENCE, § 194 (3d ed. 1940): "It may almost be said that it is because 
of this indubitable [rJelevancy of such evidence that it is excluded. It is objectionable, 
not because it has no appreciable probative value, but because it has too much." [d., 
§ 194, at 646. 
247. People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303, 317, 611 P.2d 883, 889,165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 
295 (1980) (inference of a criminal disposition may not be used to establish any link in 
the chain of logic connecting the uncharged offense with a material fact). 
248. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(b) (West 1966). 
249. [d. 
250. See, e.g., People v. Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d 561, 574, 199 Cal. Rptr. 796, 
802 (1984) (evidence of uncharged offenses may constitute evidence of a lewd disposition 
or "intent" of the defendant towards particular individuals and therefore be admissible). 
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California courts have had great difficulty determining 
whether evidence of past wrongs is impermissible character evi-
dence or permissible evidence relating to a material issue: "[t]he 
decided cases cannot be justified, distinguished, or rationalized 
with any degree of reason, consistency, or symmetry."2111 The 
California Supreme Court has in recent years attempted to end 
this confusion with several important decisions concerning the 
issue of admitting "other offense" evidence. 
In People v. Thomas,21i2 the court detailed four require-
ments that must be met before evidence of uncharged offenses 
can be admitted under section llOl(b). The prior offenses (1) 
must not be too remote in time, (2) must be similar to the of-
fense(s) charged, (3) must have been committed on persons simi-
lar to the prosecuting witness, and (4) must possess a sufficiently 
high degree of common features with the charged offense(s).2li3 
Although Thomas specifically involved the issue of a "plan," a 
similar analysis is appropriate when related issues such as "mo-
dus operandi ,"211. "identity,"21111 or "common scheme,"2116 are 
The list of potentially relevant fact issues in CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(b) (West 1966) is 
not considered to be exclusive. See, e.g., People v. Crume, 61 Cal. App. 3d 803, 812, 132 
Cal. Rptr. 577,583 (1976) (evidence of past offenses admissible to show conduct inconsis-
tent with the defendant's testimony on direct examination). See generally MCCORMICK, 
supra note 79, at § 190. 
251. JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE HANDBOOK, § 21.4, at 267 (1972). The Califor-
nia Supreme Court has admitted that their pronouncements in the area of "other 
crimes" has not been entirely consistent. See People v. Tassel, 36 Cal. 3d 77, 83, 679 P.2d 
I, 4, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567, 570 (1984). 
252. 20 Cal. 3d 457, 573 P.2d 433, 143 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1978). 
253. [d. at 465, 573 P.2d at 437, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 219. The Thomas court rejected 
evidence that defendant had committed similar acts of molestation with another daugh-
ter because the incidents occurred 10-18 years in the past. "The fact that the defendant 
had molested one daughter a decade or more ago would not establish the fact that he 
had a continuing common plan or scheme to molest all of his daughters." [d. at 466, 573 
P.2d at 437, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 219. 
254. See, e.g., People v. Barney, 143 Cal. App. 3d 490, 496, 192 Cal. Rptr. 172, 176 
(1983) (court found modus operandi when eight distinctive similarities between defen-
dant's charged sexual conduct and his conduct on other occasions with complainant and 
other daughters). 
255. See, e.g., People v. Thornton, 11 Cal. 3d 738, 758, 523 P.2d 267, 280, 114 Cal. 
Rptr. 467, 480 (1974), where evidence of past uncharged sex offenses were properly ad-
mitted to establish identity of defendant. The court held that the strength of the infer-
ence is evaluated by consideration of "the degree of distinctiveness of individual shared 
marks." [d. at 756, 523 P.2d at 279, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 479 (emphasis in original). 
256. See, e.g., People v. Haslouer, 79 Cal. App. 3d 818, 826-27, 145 Cal. Rptr. 234, 
238 (1978), where defendant's routine had become as distinctive as his signature. The 
defendant used his daughter as a procurer of young girls. When the girls arrived, they 
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involved. 
In the years since the Thomas decision, the court has held 
that even if evidence of other crimes is relevant under an iden-
tity, intent, or common scheme theory, such evidence may still 
be excluded because of its inflammatory impact.2117 Specifically, 
the court has required (1) that an issue must be expressly in 
dispute before evidence of past offenses may be heard by a 
jury,2Ii8 (2) that evidence not be cumulative with respect to other 
evidence,2119 and (3) that the prejudicial effect of the evidence be 
weighed against the probative value, in light of all the 
circumstances.26o 
were undressed and placed in T-shirts while defendant put on a bath robe. Pornographic 
playing cards were then used as initiation to sexual activity. [d. 
257. People v. Alcala, 36 Cal. 3d 604, 631, 685 P.2d 1126, 1141, 205 Cal. Rptr. 775, 
790 (1984) (holding that all doubts concerning the connection between charged and un-
charged offenses must be resolved in the accused's favor). 
258. People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303, 315, 611 P.2d 883, 888, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 
294 (1980) (the fact that an accused had pleaded not guilty was not sufficient to place 
the elements of the crimes charged against him "in issue"). The "expressly in dispute" 
requirement was upheld in People v. Tassel, 36 Cal. 3d 77, 89, 679 P.2d 1, 8, 201 Cal. 
Rptr. 567, 574 (1984). The court held in Tassel that absent an issue of identity, "it is 
immaterial whether the modus operandi of the charged crime was similar to that of the 
uncharged offenses. While the People rely on the 'common plan or scheme' rationale for 
admissibility, under the circumstances that is merely a euphemism for 'disposition.' " [d. 
After Tassel, it must be questioned whether cases such as People v. Haslouer, 79 Cal. 
App. 3d 818, 145 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1978) are still good law because there doesn't appear to 
be a true "identity" issue involved in the latter case-the evidence was merely admitted 
under a "common scheme" analysis. [d. at 827-28, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40. The "ex-
pressly in dispute" requirement also applies to cases involving the issue of intent. See, 
e.g., People v. Willoughby, 164 Cal. App. 3d 1054, 1063, 210 Cal. Rptr. 880, 886 (1985) 
(defendant catagorically denied any sexual involvement with victim; therefore, intent 
was not an issue in case and evidence or prior wrongs with another child was inadmissi-
ble). In dicta, the Willoughby court went on to say that the proferred evidence may be 
admissible under an "identity" theory because the defendant had implied that he was 
not the molester through his denials of any lewd touching and the prosecution had the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant as the perpe-
trator. [d. at 1064-65, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 887. The court went on to state that (1) the 
evidence of the prior offenses could not be deemed "cumulative" to the victim's testi-
mony, and (2) that the charged and uncharged offenses contained "highly distinctive 
marks of similarity." [d. at 1065, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 887-88. 
259. People v. Guerrero, 16 Cal. 3d 719, 724, 548 P.2d 366, 369, 129 Cal. Rptr. 166, 
169 (1976). 
260. People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303, 318, 611 P.2d 883, 890, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 
296 (1980). This requirement of weighing the prejudicial effect of relevant evidence is 
codified at CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966). This statute states: "The court in its 
discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) cre-
ate substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the 
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As result of these rules, admitting past offense evidence as 
corroboration in child sexual abuse cases is quite difficult in Cal-
ifornia. This is particularly true where the prior incident(s) in-
volved different children than the victim of the offense with 
which defendant is charged. In these situations, a pattern must 
be established that separates the defendant "from the substan-
tial portion of the population of child molesters. "261 In essence, 
the defendant must use his "signature" when he commits acts of 
molestation before non-charged offenses will be admitted. 
California courts have been more lax in allowing past of-
fense evidence under a "lewd disposition" theory of intent.262 
These cases involve prior sex acts committed upon the com-
plainant by the defendant, usually in the intimacy of family 
life.263 Such evidence tends to prove that the defendant acted to 
realize his own desires on the occasion of the charged offense 
"and is not dependent upon defendant's bad character or his 
disposition to do wrongful acts."264 As of this writing, there is no 
explicit requirement that the defendant's intent explicitly be in 
issue before evidence of past sex offenses against the complain-
ant are admissible.26~ However, use of the "lewd disposition" 
jury." [d. 
261. People v. Alcala, 36 Cal. 3d 604, 633, 685 P.2d 1126, 1142, 205 Cal. Rptr. 775, 
791 (1984). The court's holding in Alcala that the evidence of the prior offenses must 
separate the defendant "from the substantial portion of the population of child molest-
ers" portends much difficulty for the prosecution in getting before the jury the evidence 
of prior acts. This is because child molesters, as a group, tend to operate in a similar 
manner: inducing children to submit to sexual advances under circumstances where de-
tection is unlikely. Clearly establishing one molester's "modus operandi" as being sepa-
rate from that of other child molesters will not be easy, even assuming that a material 
issue such as identity or intent is actually in dispute at trial. 
262. The use of the term "lewd disposition" is common but unfortunate in that it 
implies that the evidence is being admitted solely to show defendant's bad character, 
which is expressly prohibited under CAL. EvlD. CODE § 1101(a) (West 1966). In reality, 
"lewd disposition" represents the issue of "intent," which must be proved under a prose-
cution for "lewd or lascivious" conduct. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 288 (West Supp. 1985). 
See also infra note 263 and accompanying text. 
263. See, e.g., People v. Sylvia, 54 Cal. 2d 115, 119-20, 351 P.2d 781, 785, 4 Cal. 
Rptr. 509, 513 (1960) (evidence that defendant had committed previous sex act with 
twelve-year-old complainant was admissible); People v. Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d 561, 
574, 199 Cal. Rptr. 796, 802-03 (1984) (evidence of a lewd disposition or the intent of 
defendant towards children with whom he lived was admissible); People v. Barney, 143 
Cal. App. 3d 490, 494, 192 Cal. Rptr. 172, 175 (1983) (when uncharged offenses indicate 
the emotion of sexual passion towards daughter and granddaughter, usual exclusion of 
past offenses was inapplicable). 
264. [d. at 494, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 175. 
265. See People v. Moon, 165 Cal. App. 3d 1074, 212 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1985). The 
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theory of relevancy is limited by the requirement that a com-
plainant's testimony concerning prior sexual activity be corrobo-
rated before it is admitted.266 While corroboration of recent sex 
offenses is difficult enough, corroborating past sexual acts to 
show a lustful disposition towards a complainant will often be 
impossible. 
While the issues enumerated in section llOl(b) are not con-
sidered to be exclusive,267 it has been held that the issue of a 
complainant's credibility does not, in itself, warrant the admis-
sion of past offenses by the defendant.268 Rather, evidence of 
past offenses corroborates credibility only if one of the issues 
listed in section llOl(b) is material to the case.269 Many other 
states are more lax in admitting evidence of past acts to corrobo-
rate a complainant,270 but California courts have taken the posi-
tion that to permit the introduction of all prior sex offenses on 
the issue of credibility "would absorb the general rule of exclu-
sion in its entirety."271 
California common law recognizes two other situations 
where evidence of past sexual acts by the defendant may be ad-
missible at trial. First, if the defendant testifies and denies any 
sexual contact with children, case authority permits the intro-
duction of evidence detailing defendant's past sexual activity 
Moon court cited favorably to Sylvia, Barney and Dunnahoo, (see supra note 263), while 
approving of the trial court's decision to allow testimony by the complainants of past 
sexual acts committed by defendant to be admitted notwithstanding the fact that the 
defendant's intent was not in issue. Moon, 165 Cal. App. 3d at 1079, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 
103-04. The court distinguished past cases that require that an issue such as intent must 
be expressly in dispute before evidence of past wrongs will be admitted, (see supra note 
258 and accompanying text), by stating that these cases pertained only to prior offenses 
committed against other individuals-not against the same victim. [d. at 1081, 212 Cal. 
Rptr. at 105. The court concluded that "absent express guidance from the Supreme 
Court, we cannot conclude that it has impliedly overruled People v. Sylvia and its prog-
eny." Moon, 165 Cal. App. 3d at 1081, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 105 (citation omitted). 
266. See People v. Stanley, 67 Cal. 2d 812, 817, 433 P.2d 913, 916, 63 Cal. Rptr. 825, 
828 (1967). The uncorroborated testimony of complainant regarding past acts "add[s] 
nothing to the prosecution's case ... [and] involves a substantial danger of prejudice to 
defendant." [d. at 819, 433 P.2d at 917, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 829. 
267. See supra note 250. 
268. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. 
269. People v. Thomas, 20 Cal. 3d 457, 468-69,573 P.2d 433, 439, 143 Cal. Rptr. 215, 
221 (1978). 
270. See generally 1A WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 62.2 (Tillers rev. 1983). 
271. People v. Thomas, 20 Cal. 3d 457, 468-69, 573 P.2d 433, 439, 143 Cal. Rptr. 215, 
221 (1978). 
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with children.272 This evidence shows conduct inconsistent with 
the defendant's testimony on direct examination.273 
A second instance in which evidence of prior acts may be 
admissible involves rehabilitating the complainant after im-
peachment by inconsistent statements. One court held2H that 
because the People should be allowed to explain such inconsis-
tent statements, if the explanation concerns prior sex acts be-
tween complainant and defendant, evidence concerning the prior 
sex acts should be heard by the jury.276 Although the application 
of this section is obviously limited, it does illustrate the poten-
tial pitfalls that defense counsel faces when she attempts to im-
peach complaining witnesses in child molestation prosecutions. 
Proposals have been made to liberalize the rules concerning 
the admission of evidence of past sexual misconduct by a defen-
dant charged with child molestation.276 This would undoubtedly 
increase the conviction rate in sexual abuse prosecutions, but at 
what price? The rules in California concerning evidence of past 
offenses have developed over many years and do afford the pros-
ecution the opportunity to use such evidence when it is relevant 
to an issue in dispute. Granted, finding evidence to support con-
272. People v. Crume, 61 Cal. App. 3d 803, 812-13, 132 Cal. Rptr. 577, 582-83 (1976). 
Furthermore, the Crume court held that evidence of past offenses admitted to impeach 
the credibility of the defendant need not be corroborated even if given by complainant 
because the rule requiring corroboration of past offenses (see supra note 266 and accom-
panying text) is applicable only to instances where the evidence is offered to support the 
credibility of the complainant. [d. at 813, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 583. 
273. [d. 
274. People v. Belasco, 125 Cal. App. 3d 974, 178 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1981). 
275. [d. at 981-82, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 464. The reported opinion does not detail ex-
actly how the inconsistent statements were "inextricably wound up" with the previous 
sex act, but it is not uncommon for victims of sexual abuse to make inconsistent state-
ments because of a fear of reprisal or a fear of breaking up the family. This assumes that 
a child overcomes any initial fear to report the incident in the first place. See supra note 
132 for discussion on why child may delay reporting an incident of abuse. 
276. See, e.g., J. BULKLEY, supra note 161, at 5-6. This study proposes that: 
Courts should have the discretion to admit evidence of prior 
sexual acts between the offending parent and child to show 
either: (1) a depraved or lustful disposition of the parent; or 
(2) a plan, scheme, motive, or modus operandi. Evidence of 
sexual acts by the offending parent with other children also 
should be admissible to show plan, scheme, design, motive, or 
modus operandi. 
[d. This proposal would liberalize considerably current California common law, which 
requires that a material issue such as intent or identity must be present before evidence 
of a scheme or plan would gain relevancy. See supra note 258. 
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victions is difficult in child sexual prosecutions, but defending 
against such charges is equally as difficult, especially with the 
current increase in media coverage of child sexual abuse cases. 
With the tremendous increase in reported child sexual abuse 
cases, prosecutions for child molesting will undoubtedly go up as 
well. It may prove to be deceptively easy to round up people 
with past records of sex offenses and obtain convictions based on 
these records. Innocent men (and women) could be convicted in 
the hysteria unless such prejudicial evidence is excluded. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is a physiological and psychological fact that children are 
susceptible people and may be exploited sexually. It is also a 
fact that there are tens of thousands of adults in this country 
who act upon their desires to have sex with children. With these 
facts in mind, it is not that difficult to comprehend why this 
country faces a problem of epidemic proportions-the sexual 
victimization of its youth. 
As detailed in this Comment, California courts and the state 
legislature have begun to address the numerous problems that a 
child faces when he or she becomes entwined in the web of the 
criminal justice system. While testifying in a court proceeding 
enervates most adult victims of crime, the effects on a child vic-
tim are undoubtedly more severe, especially when their testi-
mony details sexual activity with an adult. The proper focus in 
the years to come should be on considering the needs of the 
child sexual abuse victim and adapting the criminal justice sys-
tem to these needs. Studies need to be funded in the area of 
child development to help courts and juries more fully under-
stand how children react to both the sexual abuse and the crimi-
nal justice process. Potentially, such studies will lead to a 
greater development in the use of expert testimony at child mo-
lestation trials. 
In addition, a hearsay exception specifically covering state-
ments made by sexual abuse victims appears to be justified. The 
reliability and trustworthiness of such statements is at least as 
high as in the numerous other hearsay exceptions that have been 
developed over the years, and a judge may still refuse to admit 
such statements if the particular facts surrounding their disclos-
ure are suspicious. Through a carefully worded hearsay excep-
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tion, a child could still "accuse" her molester even if she were 
found incompetent to testify. 
Finally, while the true extent of child sexual abuse in this 
country is just becoming apparent, child sexual abuse cases have 
been tried in California and other states for over one hundred 
years. The law that has developed over these years should not be 
discarded wholesale in an attempt to convict child molesters. 
This is especially true in the area of "past offense" evidence 
which if introduced before a jury virtually assures the conviction 
of a defendant. Prosecutors should direct their attention to ob-
taining evidence concerning the sexual abuse incident with 
which the defendant is currently charged. In this regard, the 
medical profession needs to standardize procedures for obtaining 
evidence of sexual abuse. Reliance on this type of evidence is 
preferable to the highly prejudicial evidence of past offenses. 
With sexual abuse cases likely filling up future court dockets 
(and newspaper headlines), it could prove fatally simple to con-
vict defendants because of their reputation-and not on the 
evidence. 
Robert T. Mertens* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986. 
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